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INTRODUCTION
It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he
pleases; he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends.1

For centuries courts have recognized property rights in personal
correspondence.2 As far back as 1741, courts have held that authors of
letters retain rights to their expressions even after recipients take
possession of the letters.3 Private expression has received the protection
of property.4 Today the new medium of personal correspondence, email,
demands that same protection.5 At the click of a mouse, email recipients
parade others’ expression literally around the world, often creating a
most embarrassing outcome for the original sender.6 Electronic
1. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.).
2. See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(discussing damages for publication of copyrighted letter); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (discussing copyright invasion of plaintiff’s letters);
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 484–85 (1867) (discussing property rights of letters
and their contents); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (discussing writer’s property
rights in letters); Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 242 (discussing property rights of manuscript); Pope v.
Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608 (Ch.) (discussing property rights of writers and receivers of
letters).
3. See Pope, 26 Eng. Rep. at 608 (granting injunction to stop publication of a book of letters
written by Alexander Pope).
4. See, e.g., Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The right of the author to publish or suppress publication
of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special considerations . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd,
11 How. Pr. 49, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“We must be satisfied, that the publication of private
letters, without the consent of the writer, is an invasion of an exclusive right of property which
remains in the writer, even when the letters have been sent to, and are still in the possession of his
correspondent.”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided,
fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer of letters, though written without any purpose of
profit, or any idea of literary property possesses such a right of property in them, that they cannot be
published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice, civil or criminal, require the
publication.”); accord James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (“[A] man has a property in
his opinions and the free communication of them.”).
5. See Robert A. Cinque, Making Cyberspace Safe for Copyright: The Protection of
Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1258, 1258–59
(1995) (“With the click of a mouse or the tap of a key, virtually anyone with a computer and a
telephone can obtain vast quantities of information from almost anywhere on the globe. These
conditions pose a formidable challenge to the international protection of intellectual property.
Copyrighted works, which include . . . forms of expression, are especially vulnerable to piracy.”
(footnotes omitted)); Posting of James Grimmelmann to Yale LawMeme, Accidental Privacy Spills:
Musings on Privacy, Democracy, and the Internet, http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?
name=News&file=article&sid=938 (Feb. 19, 2003, 22:02 EST) (observing the harmful impact of not
protecting email expression through copyright law, i.e., inhibition of creative and frank thought).
6. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (reciting the intense scrutiny that the Pulitzer Prize
winning, Newsday reporter Laurie Garrett experienced after her personal email, which provided a
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forwarding is killing private expression.7 Stripped of expressive privacy,
email senders are beginning to restrain expression: where an email
sender would rather a sentiment not be forwarded to a third party, the
sentiment is simply left out of the email.8 Creative, frank, and clear
expression is suppressed to avoid the costly tariff of exposure on the
information superhighway.9 Email demands the privacy protection that
for centuries the law has afforded personal correspondence.10
Past protection of expressive privacy has existed under common-law
copyright.11 For over two-hundred years, common-law copyright offered
near-absolute protection to authors of letters.12 This protection came
through a specific right called the right of first publication.13 The right of
candid description of the World Economic Forum, ended up all over the Internet); Charles Mandel,
E-Mail Stink Proves Web’s Power, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/
privacy/0,1848,57960,00.html (reporting that a personal email that recommended its recipients
boycott fish-farming products had, after the email had been forwarded without its sender’s consent,
caused widespread alarm among fish farmers that resulted in a public apology from the sender); Ben
McGrath, Oops, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2003, at 34–35, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/talk/content/?030630ta_talk_mcgrath (collecting stories about unintended
consequences of email recipients forwarding sender’s expressions without permission).
In addition to the restraint of expression that individuals experience, businesses may incur
financial or reputational costs as a direct result of unauthorized email forwarding. See Mandel,
supra (discussing negative repercussions to employer that a personal email of its employee caused);
White Paper of Proofpoint, Inc. & Forrester Consulting, Outbound Email and Content Security in
Today’s Enterprise, 2–7, 11–15 (May 2006) (on file with author) (describing policies that US and
UK employers implement to reduce costs resulting from unauthorized viewing of employees’ email).
7. Cf. Mandel, supra note 6 (quoting professor of journalism at Columbia University for
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be
comfortable viewing on the front page of a newspaper).
8. See id. (advising restraint in email expression); cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (opining
that unprotected email may lead to a dulling of expression).
9. See sources cited supra note 6; cf. Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 62–63 (“[L]etters never
intended to be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable
than those elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”).
10. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (opining that “private letters, although not intended to be
published, and however familiar and trivial the subjects to which they relate” were the proper subject
of copyright law, and that “the writer of such letters has an absolute right to forbid their publication
by another”).
11. See cases cited supra note 2; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 5.04 (2006) (describing the protection that copyright law affords letters).
Under specific circumstances, email could be protected under trade-secret law. See, e.g., APG,
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 436 F.3d 294, 307 (1st Cir. 2006) (contemplating whether disclosure
of email constituted violation of corporate trade secret, but ultimately determining that no violation
occurred because the information was not of a confidential nature). To receive that protection, an
email must (1) mention a trade secret, and (2) disclose the trade-secret information under an
established confidential relationship. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 3.03
(2005). The application of trade-secret law to email, however, is outside the scope of this Article.
The Article considers the protection that the law confers on senders of email, regardless of the email
expression’s content.
12. See cases cited supra note 2.
13. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
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first publication allowed an author exclusive control over whether and
when a letter would be published to a third party who was not originally
intended as the recipient.14 The right ensured that letter recipients could
not copy the expression in a letter and give that copy to a third party.15
In other words, the right provided a letter author the exclusive power to
decide whether and when the expression in a letter—even if already sent
to its intended recipient—would be published. Publication to a third
party was controlled by the author. For example, an unfaithful husband
who sent amorous letters to his lover could control whether and when his
lover could copy and distribute those letters to any other person.16
Notably, common-law copyright afforded this right to authors without
requiring that an author follow any formal procedure, registration or
otherwise.17 The cheating husband would hold a common-law copyright
in the letters as soon as he penned the ink. Any expression qualified for
common-law protection.18
Then in 1976 that all changed when Congress passed the Copyright
Act.19 The Act preempts any common-law rights that are equivalent to
rights set forth under the Act.20 One of the rights in the Act purports to
provide authors a right of first publication.21 It seems, then, that letter
authors and email senders must now rely on the Act’s purported right of
14. See id. (describing the common-law right of first publication as “the author’s right to decide
when and whether [the work] will be made public”); Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 67 (“[T]he writer of
letters has an exclusive right not only to publish them himself, but to forbid their publication by
others . . . .”).
15. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (suggesting that publication
would occur if a recipient were to make a copy of the original letter and distribute that to a third
party rather than simply reading the original letter to the third party or depositing the original with
the third party for safe-keeping); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (opining that
although an author’s right of first publication exists independent of the manuscript, “this right
involves a right to copy or secure copies”); see also Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 308
(Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the copies
of it . . . .”); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.) (“It is certain every man has a
right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make
them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends.”).
16. See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175–76 (Vt. 1899) (considering the admissibility of letters
exchanged between allegedly adulterous couple).
17. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 62–63 (reviewing precedent establishing that private letters are
copyrightable and describing the right to publish them as “inherent in [the author] . . . until it is
chosen to be asserted”).
18. See id. at 63 (noting obligation of courts of equity to protect the writers of private letters
“without any other inquiry than into the fact of his authorship”).
19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000)).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
21. See id. § 106(3) (granting the owner of copyright exclusive rights “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending”).
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first publication to protect their expressive privacy. They appear to be
subject to the rules governing federal copyright law.
The Copyright Act is unlikely to protect privacy for email senders
like the common law did for letter authors.22 The Act excuses a user’s
ostensible infringing use of a work if the use in question is deemed to be
“fair.”23 A defense of fair use is usually recognized where the use does
not harm the economic value of the work.24 This is relevant to email
forwarding because the forwarding does not usually harm the sender’s
ability to market the expression, especially given that there is often no
market for casual email correspondence.25 The absence of any effect on
the market for email expression would trigger the fair-use defense.26 At
first glance, it would seem that the Act’s fair-use provision strips email
senders of the privacy protection that the common law so readily
afforded authors of letters.27 Email forwarding appears permissible
under the Act.28
Despite the Act’s fair-use provision, private email expression may
nevertheless receive legal protection.29 A strong argument exists that the
Act does not preempt the common-law right of first publication.30 This
argument stems from the premise that the Copyright and Patent Clause of
the Constitution restricts the property rights that Congress may
legislate.31 Under the Clause, if Congress legislates property rights,
those rights must further public utility.32 Public utility is not furthered by

22. See infra Part III.A–B.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
24. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (describing
the economic impact of the defendant’s use of a copyrighted work as “the single most important
element of fair use”).
25. See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.3 (providing the Copyright Act’s list of nonexhaustive criteria
in determining whether the fair-use exception applies and analyzing them in the email context).
26. See infra Part III.A.2.
27. See infra Part III.C (discussing the impact of the Copyright Act on the privacy of email
communication).
28. See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.3 (discussing the application of the fair-use doctrine on casual
email correspondence and the impact of the 1992 amendment to the Copyright Act, which appears to
remove federal copyright protection from most email).
29. See infra Parts III.C–D, IV (arguing that the apparent conflict in the Copyright Act can be
resolved to still provide legal protection to private email correspondence).
30. See infra Parts III.D, IV (providing a constitutional argument that limits the scope of the
Copyright Act).
31. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution,
which gives Congress the power to legislate property rights that promote the progress of science and
useful arts).
32. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the utilitarian nature of the Copyright and Patent Clause of
the Constitution).
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a right that allows an author to withhold a work from the public.33
Accordingly, the Constitution prohibits Congress from legislating
property rights that function to protect an author’s privacy.34 This means
that the Copyright Act’s purported right of first publication should not be
construed as a right that protects an author’s privacy.35 In other words,
the Act’s right of first publication should not be construed as a right that
protects an author’s decision whether to publish—a decision that
concerns privacy.36 The Act does not preempt common-law copyright to
the extent that the common law protects an author’s privacy interest.37
Absent preemption, the common-law right of first publication is alive
and well.38
Construing the Copyright Act as not preempting the common-law
right of first publication raises interesting implications in the email
context.39 Under the common law, unauthorized distribution of only a
few copies constitutes publication.40 The issue arises, then, as to whether
an email recipient violates the sender’s right of first publication by either
displaying to third parties a printed copy of the email or forwarding the
email to third parties.41 The common law suggests that displaying the
printed copy is permissible insofar as the email recipient does not
transfer that copy.42 Email forwarding, on the other hand, violates the
sender’s right of first publication.43 Email forwarding completely
33. See infra Part III.D.1 (arguing that where an author attempts to keep a work private, the
right does not serve a utilitarian end).
34. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing how the Constitution may prevent Congress from creating
rights that do not serve the utilitarian end of the Copyright and Patent Clause).
35. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing how the right of first publication is only valid to the extent
that it serves a utilitarian end).
36. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing how the Copyright Act only preempts common law rights
equivalent to those protected in the Act).
37. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the difference in the scope of protection afforded from the
common law and the Copyright Act).
38. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the nonequivalence of the two rights protected by the
common law and by the Copyright Act: protecting the author from being “found out” and from being
“scooped,” respectively).
39. See infra Part II (discussing the common law’s protection of email correspondence).
40. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“Publication by the author
is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing.”); Baker v. Libbie, 97
N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (opining that although an author’s right of first publication exists
independent of the manuscript, “this right involves a right to copy or secure copies”); see also Denis
v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be
violated, by multiplying the copies of it . . . .”).
41. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing the impact of forwarding or physically displaying email
communication on the sender’s right to first publication).
42. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how at common law the recipient of a letter could show it
to others as long as he did not make copies of it).
43. See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing how forwarding an email deprives the original sender of
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duplicates the original expression and transfers a copy of that duplication
to a third party,44 and the common law directly prohibits this practice.45
Finally, it should be noted that a corollary to this common-law rule is
that an author may relinquish the right of first publication by transferring
a copy to a third party.46 This means that carbon copying a third party on
an email may create a presumption that the sender meant to relinquish his
common-law protection of expressive privacy.47
The common law’s governance of property rights in letters also
raises implications regarding the rights that email recipients hold in
email. Under the common law, a letter recipient holds property rights in
the physical materials composing a letter while the letter author retains
rights to the expression within the letter.48 This principle suggests that
email recipients own the computer files that constitute the received
emails.49 The email recipient may therefore exercise physical dominion
over the file: he may preserve, destroy, or transfer the file insofar as a
copy does not result.50 Similarly, the recipient may physically move the
email file to any location, and further, may display the email to a third
party without violating the sender’s property rights.51 Finally, the
common law suggests that email recipients to whom the sender
mistakenly sends an email, i.e., unintended recipients, hold no property
rights in the email file as against the sender.52 This is because the law of
gifts and the law of finders control an unintended recipient’s property

his privacy).
44. See infra Part II.A.2.a (describing how email forwarding works).
45. See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing how principles at common law that prevent the copying
of letters apply to email communication to not allow email forwarding).
46. See Kortlander v. Bradford, 190 N.Y.S. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (“This exclusive
right is confined to the first publication. When once published it is dedicated to the public, and the
author has not at common law any exclusive right to multiply copies of it or to control the
subsequent issues of copies by others.” (citing Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872))); Widdemer
v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65 (C.P. 1887) (discussing how a husband destroyed his privacy
expectation when he allowed a bishop to read the letter to his wife and therefore the wife was
allowed to spread the publication of the letter if she wished).
47. See infra Part II.A.2.c (discussing how carbon copying a third party on an email causes the
sender to relinquish the right of first publication).
48. Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The [letter] author parts with the
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope. These are given to the
receiver.”).
49. See infra Part II.B (discussing the rights of letter recipients at common law and the
applicability of those rights to email recipients).
50. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how an email recipient’s property rights are in the
computer file and not the expression contained within the email).
51. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing permissible transfers of email communication).
52. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the rights of unintended recipients of email communication
using the principles of gift-and-finders law).
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rights in the email file.53 A donee of a gift must be the intended donee to
acquire property rights as against the donor.54 Unintended email
recipients, then, hold no property rights to the email as against the
sender: they are finders of lost property, and accordingly, must destroy it
upon the sender’s request.55
This Article examines the extent to which an email sender may
enforce property rights to email expression to ensure privacy. Part II
applies the common-law right of first publication to the email context. It
discusses how common-law principles that govern the rights of letter
authors and recipients affect the rights of email senders and recipients.56
Part III examines whether the Copyright Act adopts the common-law
right of first publication. It concludes that the Act does not incorporate
the same privacy protection as the common-law right of first publication
because the Act allows for liberal application of the fair-use defense.57
Part III next examines whether the Act preempts the common-law right
of first publication.58 Based on the view that the Copyright and Patent
Clause restricts Congress to legislate property rights that further a
utilitarian purpose, Part III posits that the Act cannot constitutionally
protect an author’s interest in keeping a work from the public.59 For this
reason, Part III posits that the Act does not preempt the common-law
right of first publication.60 Part IV evaluates whether a dual copyright
system—the common-law system to protect privacy interests and the
federal-law system to protect commercial interests—is advisable. It
examines issues relating to whether a dual system is practicable61 and
whether privacy in expression is good policy.62 The Article concludes
that the common-law right of first publication should be invoked to
protect an email sender’s privacy interests.

53. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 111–12 (“The author parts with the physical and material elements
which are conveyed by and in the envelope. These are given to the receiver.”); Eyre v. Higbee, 22
How. Pr. 198, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (“We must . . . presume a grant of the letters from him to
her.”).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (“The owner
of personal property may make a gift thereof to another person (the donee) by delivering it to the
donee . . . with the manifested intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property.”).
55. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing how unintended recipients of emails are finders of lost
property and as such have inferior property rights to the email as the sender).
56. See infra Part II.A–B.
57. See infra Part III.A–C.
58. See infra Part III.D.
59. See infra Part III.D.1.
60. See infra Part III.D.2.
61. See infra Part IV.A.
62. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. THE COMMON LAW’S PROTECTION OF EMAIL EXPRESSION
Property rights in email expression derive from the common law’s
recognition of property rights in personal correspondence. At common
law, a letter author held property rights in the expression of the letter,
and a letter recipient held property rights only to the physical
components of a letter.63 Application of this simple principle in the
email context suggests that dual categories of property rights exist in any
email. The sender retains rights to the electronic expression; the
recipient receives rights to the physical email file. The following
subparts analyze these respective rights.
A. The Rights of Email Senders
Common-law copyright’s protection of an author’s private
expression traces back to the eighteenth century.64 Well established is
the common-law principle that an author retains a right to control the
first instance that the author’s expression may be made public.65 Under
this right, a letter author controls whether the letter will be published to
the public, and if so, when it will first be published.66 “Public” in this
63. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The author parts with the
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope. These are given to the
receiver.”).
64. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.) (“[T]he manuscript is, in every
sense, his peculiar property; and no man can take it from him, or make any use of it which he has not
authorized, without being guilty of a violation of his property.”); Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep.
608, 608 (Ch.) (“[W]here a man writes a letter, it is in the nature of a gift to the receiver. . . . [T]his
does not give a license to any person whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the
receiver has only a joint property with the writer.”).
65. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“[W]e incline to the
conclusion that the weight of authority, fortified by analogy, preponderates in favor of the author’s
special property in the publication, and in his consequential right to publish . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd,
11 How. Pr. 49, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (interpreting English common law to have rejected the
argument that “there can be no property” in “familial letters, not intended by the writers to be
published”); Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175 (Vt. 1899) (dictum) (“[T]he view most consonant with
reason, justice, and sound public policy is that which holds that a court of equity will protect the
right of property in such letters by enjoining their unauthorized publication by any person who may
attempt or intend such publication. Such protection is based solely on the property of the writer or
possessor of such letters therein.”). Perhaps the strongest endorsement of the property nature in the
rights that an author holds over personal correspondence is found in Baker v. Libbie: “The existence
of a right in the author over his letters, even though private and without worth as literature, is
established on principle and authority. The right is property in its essential features. It is, therefore,
entitled to all the protection which the Constitution and laws give to property.” 97 N.E. at 111.
66. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985) (describing
the common-law right of first publication as “the author’s right to decide when and whether [the
work] will be made public”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The right of the author to publish or suppress
publication of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special considerations, and is
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sense has a broad meaning: it means any third party who is not the
original intended recipient.67 Sending a letter to its intended recipient,
then, does not amount to making expression “public,” whereas sending a
copy of the letter to any other person does. The right effectively allows
an author to keep expression private regardless of whether the expression
has any literary value.68 This right is referred to as the right of first
publication.69
Applying this right of first publication to email requires
understanding the principle of privacy underlying this right and the
common-law rules growing out of this right. This principle of privacy,
the attendant rules of the common law, and their application to email are
set forth below in the ensuing subparts.
1. The Common Law’s Protection of Privacy
Common-law copyright exists to protect privacy in written
expression.70 That purpose was articulated by Samuel Warren and Louis
independent of any desire or intent at the time of writing.”).
67. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 484–85, 488–89 (defining publication as circulation before
the “public eye” and suggesting that publication would occur if a recipient were to make a copy of
the original letter and distribute that to a third party rather than simply reading the original letter to
the third party or depositing the original with the third party for safe-keeping); accord Baker, 97
N.E. at 111 (opining that although an author’s right of first publication exists independent of the
manuscript, “this right involves a right to copy or secure copies”); Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.)
297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the
copies of it.”); Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 242 (“It is certain every man has a right to keep his own
sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or
commit them only to the sight of his friends.”).
68. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (“I
hold, that the author of any letter or letters . . . whether they are literary compositions, or familiar
letters, or letters of business, possess the sole and exclusive copyright therein; and that no persons,
neither those to whom they are addressed, nor other persons, have any right or authority to publish
the same upon their own account, or for their own benefit.”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The existence
of a right in the author over his letters . . . is established [even without worth as literature] . . . .”);
Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63, 68 (commenting that “[e]very writing, in which words are so arranged
as to convey the thoughts of the writer to the mind of a reader, is a literary composition” to support
its holding that copyright applies to “private letters, although not intended to be published, and
however familiar and trivial the subject to which they relate” to the extent that an author holds “an
absolute right to forbid their publication by another”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670,
675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided, fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer of letters,
though written without any purpose of profit, or any idea of literary property possesses such a right
of property in them, that they cannot be published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice,
civil or criminal, require the publication.”); accord Denis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 302 (holding that “the
right of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the writer” notwithstanding that the letter was “not
written with a view to profit”).
69. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552; see also Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d
Cir. 1976) (“[T]he common law copyright is, in essence, a right of first publication, which of
necessity includes the right to suppress any publication by injunction.” (internal citations omitted)).
70. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (“It is true that common-law copyright was often
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Brandeis in their seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to
Privacy.71 Warren and Brandeis opined that the right of first publication
under common-law copyright is a manifestation of a more general
right—the right to be let alone.72 Underlying the right to be let alone,
Warren and Brandeis declared, is the ideal of an inviolate personality.73
And, they continued, part of one’s personality is one’s expression:
making public an expression that was intended to be private constitutes
an attack on personality.74 Warren and Brandeis thus concluded that an
interest inherent in one’s person, which falls within the ambit of the
general right to be let alone, is the interest one holds in privacy of
expression.75 Personal correspondence represents one’s very personality,
and so, Warren and Brandeis argued, such correspondence merits as
much protection as any other personality interest.76 It merits protection
of its inherently private nature.77
This interest in keeping correspondence private is apparent in the
email context. Senders of email are interested in ensuring that no one
other than the intended recipient views the electronic recording of the
sender’s expression.78 That is, the sender desires that a copy of the email
will not end up in the hands of a third party.79 This of course does not
enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1004 (1970) (“[C]ommon law copyright, in its coverage of letters, . . .
protects personal rather than economic values and clothes privacy with the attributes of property.”);
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890)
(“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”).
71. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–99, 204–05.
72. Id. at 205. The right to be let alone is, according to Warren and Brandeis, a right inherent
in one’s person; specific examples of this general right include the right not to be assaulted or
beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, and the right not to be defamed. Id.
73. See id. (“The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions .
. . is . . . that of an inviolate personality.”).
74. Id.
75. See id. (“[T]he conclusion [is] that the protection afforded to thoughts . . . is merely an
instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be left alone.”).
76. Id. at 205–07.
77. Id. at 205.
78. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (opining that unprotected email may lead to a dulling of
expression); Mandel, supra note 6 (relying on professor of journalism at Columbia University for
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be
comfortable viewing on a public website).
79. Two examples illustrate this interest of a sender. The first occurred when a Newsday
reporter and former Pulitzer Prize winner, Laurie Garrett, wrote a candid email summarizing her
experience at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. Grimmelmann, supra note 5. Without a
doubt, the email was written very casually: she called Vicente Fox “sexy”; she described the wireless
infrastructure as “very cool”; she misstated the phrase “various and sundry” as “various insundry.”
Id. Garrett then sent the email to a “handful” of friends. Id. About a week after sending it, the
email had been forwarded several times, and to Garrett’s dismay, appeared on a publicly accessible
website. Id. After that, it became public news. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 6 (reporting Garrett’s
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apply to all email senders: there can be no doubt that some senders of
email do not expect, and perhaps discourage, their email to be kept
private.80 Just as some authors of letters do not mind if their sentiments
are passed along to third parties, so also do some email senders not
expect any privacy restriction.81 But the relevant point is that the interest
to hold expression private is present in the email context, regardless of
whether all email senders hold that interest.
The question of whether the law should secure an email sender’s
interest in privacy raises the issue of whether the type of personal
correspondence to which Warren and Brandeis referred, and that the
common law contemplates, is sufficiently analogous to email
correspondence. Simply put: Do the principles and rules governing
expression in physical letters extend to expression in email? The opinion
expressed by Warren and Brandeis suggests so. They opined that the
right to privacy underlying letter correspondence exists “wholly
independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the
thought, sentiment, or emotion is expressed.”82 This conclusion appears
to be correct. The privacy interest that copyright protects is with respect
to the expression—not the physical material on which the expression is
recorded.83 Expression in electronic form is just as much a part of one’s
personality as expression on physical paper. Principles, rules, and
rationales governing expression in letters should apply to expression in
email. The privacy interest that underlies common-law copyright has a
place in email expression.
email experience).
The second example occurred when a high-level employee of an environmental nonprofit
foundation sent a private email to a limited number of recipients. Id. The employee was an
aquaculture specialist for the foundation. Id. In the email she advised the recipients to fax fish
farmers that they were boycotting fish products over an issue relating to sea lice. Id. The email
included the following line: “Tormenting fish farmers is fun – it really, really is.” Id. Not long after
sending it, the email found its way onto the public stage of the Internet. Id. The fish-farm industry
was very displeased with her sentiments, and imputed the employee’s email to the environmental
foundation. Id. Predictably, the employee issued an apology. Id.
80. For instance, senders of “spam” email would not seek to maintain privacy of expression.
See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 894–97 (N.D. Iowa
2001) (suggesting that senders of spam email commercially benefit from massive distribution of
their expression).
81. See, e.g., id. at 894 (explaining a case in which the National Health Care Discounts’ vicepresident contacted an emailer to send commercial email for a fee).
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 199.
83. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (teaching that a letter recipient has
rights to the physical components of a letter “as absolute owner subject only to the proprietary right
retained by the author for himself and his representatives to the publication or nonpublication of
ideas in its particular verbal expression”); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 206–07 (suggesting
that privacy protection extends to various media of expression).
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2. The Right of First Publication
The common law secures privacy of expression through the right of
first publication.84 That right can be thought of as comprising two steps.
The first step represents the author’s choice to decide whether to publish
the expression in the letter.85 An author may decide never to publish the
expression such that the author’s privacy receives protection
indefinitely.86 In that circumstance, the second step is never reached. If,
on the other hand, the author does decide to publish it, the second step
occurs: the right of first publication allows the author to decide when the
first publication will occur.87 This second step protects the author’s
interest in keeping the expression private from the point of publication
decision to the actual time of publication.88 The second step protects the
expression’s yet-to-be-realized commercial value, which the author has
already decided to realize.89 Realization of an expression’s commercial
value depends on the author being able to publish the expression before
anyone else.90 In this way, the second step—the right to decide when to
publish—protects the author’s interest in realizing the commercial value
of the expression. Thus, the right of first publication protects two
seemingly contrary interests: the author’s interest in keeping the
expression private, and the author’s interest in realizing commercial gain.
The right protects the former interest by allowing the author exclusive
control over whether to publish; the right protects the latter interest
84. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985) (describing
privacy as purpose of right of first publication).
85. Id. at 551; see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 484 (1867) (“[T]he
author should have the right to decide for himself whether the publication would be useful to the
public and profitable to himself . . . .”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (“[An author]’s proprietary power is to
make or restrain a publication . . . .”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855)
(“[T]he writer of letters has an exclusive right not only to publish them himself, but to forbid their
publication by others . . . .”).
86. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (“Under common-law copyright, the property of the
author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same.”
(internal quotations omitted)); Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 302 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he right
of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the writer, till he abandons it, and if not abandoned,
passes at his death to his representatives.”).
87. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (stating that “publication . . . [before the author] has
authorized its dissemination seriously infringes on the author’s right to decide when and whether” to
publish).
88. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21
(1990) (observing a distinction between protection of unpublished works that were created for
publication or on their way to publication and unpublished works never intended for publication).
89. See id. at 1122 (summarizing the concerns relevant in protecting the expectations of
creators that copyright law was created to protect).
90. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554–55 (stating that the “author’s control of first public
distribution implicates . . . his property interest . . . which [is] valuable in [it]self”).
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(where the author does decide to publish it) by allowing the author
exclusive control over when to publish.91
The common law’s protection of expressive privacy through the right
of first publication is nearly absolute.92 Exceptions are rare.93 The fact
that an unauthorized copy may appear “reasonable and customary” does
not affect the strength of the author’s common-law right.94 Further
privacy protection is manifest by the common law’s definition of
publication: “publication” constitutes any circulation of a multiplication
of the original expression.95 This definition prohibits circulating even
91. See id. (“In its commercial guise, . . . an author’s right to choose when he will publish is no
less deserving of protection.”).
92. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“The property right of the author . . .
to publish or suppress publication of his correspondence is absolute in the absence of special
considerations.”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 62–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[T]he writer of
such letters has an absolute right to forbid their publication by another . . . .”).
93. Circumstances where a court has ruled that publication is proper even though the author
does not consent include the following: (1) the letter is necessary for a recipient to establish rights in
a lawsuit, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346–47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.); (2)
parts of a letter are necessary to furnish information that will vindicate the recipient’s character and
reputation, or free the author from unjust humiliation and reproach, id.; (3) the author intends to
dedicate his or her rights to the expression to the public or to the recipient, id.; (4) the letter is from a
public officer to a government body, id.; (5) the letter constitutes an instrument or means for the
accomplishment of an unlawful purpose, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Int’l Magazine Co., 294 F.
661, 663 (2d Cir. 1923); and (6) the author relinquishes the right by publishing the letter, Widdemer
v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65 (C.P. 1887).
94. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550–51.
95. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488–89 (1867) (“Publication by the
author is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing. . . . [A letter
recipient] may do every thing but multiply copies, and perhaps he may do this, if he do [sic] not print
them.” (internal quotations omitted)); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (“In this opinion, publication has been
used in the sense of making public through printing or multiplication of copies.”); Widdemer, 19 Pa.
C. at 264–65 (holding that letter author had made publication by sending the letter to two third-party
recipients in addition to its intended recipient).
Tellingly, the Grigsby court commented that a recipient may be able to “multiply” copies of an
author’s expression so long as the recipient does not “print” those copies. 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 489. It
is possible that at the time of the opinion in 1867, “multiplying” copies by hand did not suggest that
the recipient was distributing the copies to third parties, whereas “printing” copies by machine did
suggest third-party distribution.
One court has held that a publication did not occur where there occurred a limited distribution of
copies of a letter. Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978). That court’s
holding, however, seems misstated. The reason for the copying and distribution was to maintain
national security. Id. at 321. Public policy dictates that this reason for copying and distribution
appears to be a justifiable exception to the right of first publication. Hence, the Birnbaum court’s
holding appears correct insofar as it permits publication on the basis of a compelling government
interest. It appears incorrect insofar as it labels the copying and distribution as anything other than a
publication. See id. (finding that “reading of the plaintiff’s letters by several persons, none of whom
circulated them to the world, is not a publication that destroys the value of the work”).
A less common but broader definition of publication is any multiplication of the original
expression, irrespective of whether the multiplication is circulated. See Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart.
(o.s.) 297, 308 (Orleans 1811) (“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by
multiplying the copies of it . . . .”). The rationale for this broad definition appears to be that an extra
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one copy of a letter. For instance, it precludes distributing a copy of
amorous communications by a husband’s lover.96 Distribution of even
one copy of such a letter would be sufficient to destroy the lover’s
privacy, especially when that copy finds its way into the hands of the
husband’s former wife.97 The common-law protection of privacy
prohibits letter recipients from distributing any copy of the expression.98
a. Common-Law Prohibition of Email Forwarding
Under the recognized common-law definition of publication, an
email sender may preclude the recipient from distributing copies of the
email to third parties. A frequent occurrence of such distribution arises
in the practice of email forwarding. Email forwarding is common
because it is so effortless: a click of the mouse allows complete
duplication and distribution of the sender’s expression.99 Nevertheless,
the fact that forwarding may be performed with ease does not alter the
fact that the forwarding deprives the sender of privacy.100 The common
law would forbid that act, for the expression in an email is as private as
the expression in a letter. The ease of copying the expression should not
affect the analysis to determine whether the act in question—forwarding
an email—invades the sender’s privacy interest. Common-law copyright
principles condemn email forwarding as a violation of the sender’s
property rights in the electronic expression.101
copy of a letter could possibly come into possession of a third party, so that copy could possibly
destroy the author’s privacy in the expression.
96. See King v. King, 168 P. 730, 733 (Wyo. 1917) (prohibiting former wife from gaining
possession of copy of letter from husband’s second wife, where letter was allegedly relevant to
divorce proceeding).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488–89 (recognizing the duty of privacy and secrecy
of personal letters); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (noting that the exceptions to the “absolute right of the
author to prevent publication by the receiver” are “narrow and rare”); Denis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) at 308
(“[T]he property of the writer of a letter may be violated, by multiplying the copies of it . . . .”);
Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65 (discussing the right to privacy and possible waivers); King, 168 P.
at 731 (protecting privacy right in a letter relevant to a divorce proceeding).
99. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (describing why copying and redistributing another’s
expression is so effortless through the email-forwarding function).
100. See generally, e.g., id. (describing the intense scrutiny that Pulitzer Prize Newsday reporter,
Laurie Garrett, experienced after her personal email, which provided a candid description of the
World Economic Forum, ended up all over the Internet).
101. Accord Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 199 (opining that the right of first publication
“is wholly independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the thought, sentiment, or
emotion is expressed”); see also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (dictum) (recognizing author’s right of first publication with regard to a
telegram, which, like email, constitutes expression by means of electrical impulse), aff’d, 285
N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1967).
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An argument may be made that email forwarding is permissible
because the practice is so common.102 All email programs have
forwarding capability, so any email sender with reasonable knowledge of
how email works will know that the email recipient has the ability to
forward along the email to any third party. Any sender who is at all
familiar with email practice should know that email recipients often
utilize this forwarding capability. It is arguable, then, that by sending an
email, the sender implicitly consents, or at least assumes the risk, that the
expression in the email may be forwarded to a third party. Common
practice, and thereby common sense, suggests that the sender implicitly
consents to email forwarding based on the sender’s very use of email.
It is also arguable that email forwarding is permissible because
recipients do so not for the purpose of duplicating the expression therein,
but rather to communicate to a third party the senders’ ideas. Authority
exists for the proposition that the right of first publication does not secure
an author property rights in the idea that the author has expressed, but
rather only in the expression of that idea.103 A recipient arguably
forwards email to communicate a sender’s idea within the expression
rather than to communicate the sender’s actual expression. Stated
differently, a recipient would paraphrase the sender’s expression except
that the single-click method of forwarding is easier than expending effort
to paraphrase. This reason for recipient forwarding suggests that the
recipient does not intend to pirate the recipient’s expression, but rather
intends only to communicate the recipient’s ideas.104 On this basis it is
arguable that forwarding is permissible.
These two arguments in favor of email forwarding are not
persuasive.105 The first argument stems from the notion that the number
102. Cf. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. See, 46 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (dictum) (“Implied
permission is determined from the facts and circumstances of the case and usually arises from a
course of conduct of the parties over a period of time.”); Penza v. Century Indem. Co., 197 A. 29, 30
(N.J. 1938) (dictum) (“Permission to take and use a car upon a particular occasion . . . may in a
proper case be implied by usage and common practice of the parties.”).
103. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (opining that letter author holds proprietary right to “verbal
expression”); accord Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991)
(recognizing that copyright applies to expression, rather than idea within the expression, under
federal Copyright Act).
104. See sources cited infra note 105.
105. The common practice of email forwarding merits a brief discussion on how the descriptive
term of “forward” may be affecting social acceptance of copyright-infringing behavior.
Unsurprisingly, programmers of email software chose the word “forward” to denote the process of
copying an email and distributing to a third party. The term “forwarding” does not suggest
impermissibility. Under the common law, a person who merely forwards along a misrepresentation
is arguably not liable for that misrepresentation. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Trinity-W. Title Co., 985
S.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that title company was not liable for seller’s
misrepresentation on the basis that the title company “merely passed along the information [it] had
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of people engaging in email forwarding should make the practice
reasonable and customary.
But common-law copyright permits
“reasonable and customary” uses only if the author impliedly consents to
such uses by releasing a work for public consumption.106 In other words,
under the common law there must be publication before what is
reasonable and customary becomes relevant as to whether a use of a
work is permissible.107 Assuming the email sender does not publish the
email, there would be no implied consent.108
The second argument bases liability on intent: the recipient
apparently does not intend to pirate expression, but rather simply
forwards the email because clicking the forward button is less
burdensome than paraphrasing the sender’s expression. Justice Story
rejected such a contention in a landmark common-law copyright case,
Folsom v. Marsh:109 “The intention to pirate is not necessary in an action
of this sort; it is enough, that the publication complained of is in
substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another is prejudiced.”110
Intent is, according to Justice Story, irrelevant in determining whether
expressive piracy has occurred.111 Regardless of whether the intent to
pirate is present, a recipient who forwards email violates the email
sender’s right of expression.112

received”). Forwarding suggests the act of passing along so that the email recipient acts as a mere
pass-along, or in other words a connection, between the original sender and the ultimate third-party
recipient. See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1989) (defining “forward” as meaning “to send forward; transmit, esp. to a new location”). This
meaning of forwarding would be legally accurate if in fact the sender requested, or consented to, the
third-party’s receipt of the email. In that instance, the original email recipient would act as a mere
pass-along because the recipient would be a chain in the distribution that the sender had intended.
But copying and distributing an email without permission does not reflect the common-usage
dictionary-definition of “forward.” In that circumstance, the meaning would more likely be captured
by the terminology, “copy and redistribute.” Yet a “copy and redistribute” button is not as spatially
efficient on a computer screen. It is possible, then, that users of email forward private
correspondence based on, at least in part, the subtle mis-identification applied to the feature that
enables the recipient to copy the email and distribute it to others without permission. A user is less
likely to recognize the impermissibility of copying and distributing based on the seemingly
innocuous label of “forward.”
106. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1985).
107. See id. (stating that “fair use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges of
copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works” (citations omitted)).
108. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1662–63 (1999) (arguing against “consent traps” on websites).
109. 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
110. Id. at 348.
111. Id.
112. See id. (stating that the inclusion of excerpts of copyrighted material would be “an invasion
of that right”).
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The common law’s rejection of common practice and intent to
uphold expressive privacy is based on the fact that ensuring expressive
privacy ultimately ensures better quality expression.113 If email senders
lack an expectation of privacy, creative and frank expression become
guarded.114 Email senders speak more freely than they otherwise would
when they have an assurance that the expression in the email will not be
forwarded without permission.115 The possibility of forwarding email
deters senders’ expression.116 And if the current state of email is such
that senders do in fact expect an email to be forwarded, then
communications are not as creative and frank as they otherwise could
be.117 The presence of an expectation that recipients will forward email
does not represent a legal norm, but rather a deficiency in the
enforcement of senders’ rights of expression. Consistent with the
common-law right of first publication, the law should be strengthened so
that “forwarding” is recognized as impermissible copying and
distribution.
b. Limits to the Right in the Email Context
Applying the common-law right of first publication to the email
context raises issues regarding whether an email recipient violates that
right by the mere fact that the email server that the recipient utilizes
makes copies of the email expression during the email delivery
process.118 Stated another way, the technical process of receiving email
113. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 62–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[L]etters never
intended to be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable
than those elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”).
114. See Mandel, supra note 6 (quoting a professor of journalism at Columbia University for the
proposition that email senders must restrict their expression to that which the senders would be
comfortable viewing on the front page of the newspaper); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5
(positing that email senders will not include private sentiments if expression is not protected); cf.
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1425–26 (2000) (arguing that invasion of informational privacy will lead people to be more
cautious).
115. See sources cited supra notes 113–14.
116. See sources cited supra notes 113–14.
117. See Mandel, supra note 6 (stating that email senders should not send an email unless they
are comfortable with it being published on the front page of the newspaper); Grimmelmann, supra
note 5 (stating that people “will stop using email for certain matters, if this is what happens when
they use it”); cf. Cohen, supra note 114, at 1426 (“The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our
aspirations to it.”).
118. See Marshall Brain, How E-mail Works, http://www.howstuffworks.com/email.htm/
printable (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (stating that a server may save several pieces of information
from an email).
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requires copies of the email to be made for the ultimate benefit of the
email recipient,119 and those copies raise the issue of whether the
sender’s right of first publication is violated. As further discussed below,
that technical process suggests that there should be limitations on an
email sender’s right of first publication.
The process for sending and receiving email is rather simple. An
email recipient must employ an email client, which is a program that
allows recipients to read email, e.g., Outlook Express or Eudora.120
Outlook Express (and all other email clients) receives email through an
email server. Email servers are machines that transmit email files
between each other through the Internet.121 So, each email recipient
employs an email client, e.g., Outlook Express, which receives data from
a specific email server, and that email server receives data from other
email servers which respectively correspond with the email clients of the
email senders.122 This process is relevant to the right of first publication
because when a recipient’s email server “sends” an email file to the
recipient’s email client, the server actually makes a copy of the file and
sends the copy to the client.123 Outlook Express receives only copies of
email files from an email server; the original email files lie with the
email server.124 After sending a copy to Outlook Express, the server
either retains the original email file or deletes it.125
This process raises the issue of whether copies of email that Outlook
Express receives from its email server violate the sender’s right of first
publication. The issue is magnified where a recipient may designate
through the email client that the recipient be able to view the email both
through the email client, e.g., Outlook Express, and through the email
server on the Internet, e.g., the Yahoo! server.126 If the email server
sends a copy to the email client and also retains the email file, an email
recipient may view the email through both the email server and the email
client. The user may access two copies of the expression—one on the
user’s hard drive through Outlook Express and another on the email
119. Id.
120. Id. Like Outlook and Eudora, some email clients stand alone, meaning that they exist
independently of the Internet on the user’s computer machine; by contrast, some email clients exist
on the Internet, such as Yahoo! and Hotmail.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. (discussing how email clients save coded versions of email attachments that are then
decoded for the user automatically).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The recipient would actually view the copy on the email server through an email client
program that interfaces through the server through the Internet. Id.
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server of Yahoo!. The copy that an email server sends to Outlook
Express seems to violate the sender’s right of first publication.127 It is a
copy that the sender never expressly authorizes.
This seeming violation should not be viewed as an actual violation of
the sender’s right of first publication. By engaging in email, a sender
implicitly consents to the electronic processes involved in delivering
email to the intended recipient. Part of that delivery process consists of
an email server copying the email file and sending the copy to Outlook
Express, or any other email client. The copying is a necessary step in
email delivery, for a recipient must employ an email client to view email.
Furthermore, the fact that a recipient might view the email through two
different sources—Outlook Express on the recipient’s hard drive and the
Yahoo! email server on the Internet—does not lessen the sender’s
privacy. That the recipient may access two copies of the same
expression does not imply that an unintended third party will view the
sender’s expression. There is no circulation of a copy to a third party.
The existence of two copies does not imply that the sender has lost any
privacy. In the absence of privacy deprivation, there should be no
violation of the right of first publication.128
Given that an email server may make and distribute a copy of the
email to Outlook Express without violating the sender’s right of first
publication, an issue arises as to whether the email server may
permissibly make and distribute multiple copies of the email to multiple
email clients. Simply put, an issue arises as to whether multiple persons
may receive the same email that a sender transmits to one email address.
This issue exists because several persons may each have their own
Outlook Express program that receives email through the same email
address as the other persons. That is, multiple email clients may be tied
to a single email address on an email server, so that multiple persons may
receive the same email sent to a single email address. For example,
multiple editors of a law review might each have Outlook Express on
their own computers, and through those Outlook Express programs, the
editors might each receive a copy of any email sent to
editors@lawreview.edu. An issue thus arises as to whether the multiple
copies that the email server sends each email client would constitute a
violation of the sender’s right of first publication.
It appears that in certain circumstances the right of first publication is
127. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the right of first publication).
128. The issue of whether an email recipient may provide a third party access to the email stored
through the recipient’s email client or email server raises an entirely different issue. This Article
addresses that issue in Part II.B.2.a.
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violated where one email address corresponds to multiple email clients.
Those circumstances arise where the email address signifies that only
one person will receive the email: in that situation, the sender reasonably
expects that only one recipient will receive the expression. Tying
multiple email clients to a single-name email address would contravene
that expectation. For example, if a student sent an email to a particular
professor’s email address, such as nsnow@uark.edu, the student would
expect that only the professor would receive that email. The expectation
would of course be violated if it turned out that other professors also
received the student’s email through that address. Because the email
address suggests that only one recipient will receive the email, the
presence of multiple recipients would effectively result in the expression
being published to unintended third parties. Therefore, where an email
address indicates that only one person will receive the email, the
presence of multiple recipients on that email address (through multiple
email clients) likely would violate the sender’s right of first publication.
In the situation where an email address fails to indicate that only one
person will receive the email file, it appears that the right of first
publication would not be violated. The email sender would have no
expectation that the email would be received by only one person. By
sending an email to editors@lawreview.edu, an email sender would not
reasonably expect that only one editor will receive the email. It is as
though the email sender sent each editor an individual email. That being
the case, it is noteworthy that the email sender still has an expectation of
privacy in the email sent to each recipient. The email sender has an
expectation that each recipient receiving email through the single email
address will not disclose the expression to third parties.129
In summary, copies of email sent from an email server to an email
client, such as Outlook Express, do not violate the right of first
publication where there is only one email client corresponding to the
email address. If there are multiple email clients corresponding to an
email address, and if the email address suggests that only one recipient
will receive the email through that address, then the copies that the email
server sends to the multiple clients violate the sender’s right of first
publication. By contrast, if an email address does not suggest that only
one recipient will receive the email through that address, then the right of
first publication is not violated, and the sender retains a right of first
129. An ostensible presence of multiple email clients on a single email address is analogous to
an email sender designating multiple recipients in the “to” field of the email. The sender would have
an expectation of expressive privacy as to each recipient, and accordingly, would hold a right of first
publication as to each identical expression received by each recipient. See infra Part II.A.2.c.

SNOW FINAL.DOC

2007]

7/15/2007 3:48:30 PM

A COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM

523

publication over each copy distributed to each recipient of the email
address.
c. Relinquishment of the Right by Carbon Copying
Under common-law copyright, once an author publishes a letter to a
third party who is not the intended recipient, the author has relinquished
the right of first publication.130 For instance, if an author were to send a
letter to its intended recipient, and then send a copy of that same letter to
a third party, the author would have published the letter to the third party,
and accordingly would have relinquished his or her right not to publish
the letter.131 The author’s publication to a third party thereby excuses a
recipient’s subsequent publication.132 By publishing a letter to a third
party, the author foregoes the common law’s protection of privacy.133
The rationale underlying this rule of relinquishment is simple: If the
author were interested in keeping a letter private, the author would not
provide a copy of the letter to the third party.
The principle that an author relinquishes the right of first publication
upon publishing the private expression to a third party raises
complexities in the email context. An email sender often sends a single
email to multiple recipients using a variety of different methods. It is
arguable that each of these methods result in relinquishment of the
sender’s common-law right of first publication. The simplest method
occurs when an email sender specifies more than one email address in
the “to” field. Each “to” field recipient receives an identical expression
from the sender. Arguably, then, the sender has relinquished the right of
first publication by publishing the expression to more than one person.
With regard to multiple “to” field recipients, this relinquishment
argument would not likely succeed. Designating multiple “to” field
recipients is analogous to sending an identical letter to multiple
recipients. If a letter author intends for the expression in the letter to

130. See Kortlander v. Bradford, 190 N.Y.S. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (stating that “once
published it is dedicated to the public, and the author has not at common law any exclusive right . . .
to control the subsequent issue of copies by others”); Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–65
(C.P. 1887) (holding that the “making known to others the contents of [a] letter” constitutes a
publication).
131. See Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65 (holding that letter was published where the author sent
the letter to two third-party recipients in addition to its intended recipient).
132. Id. Although the recipient would still be subject to statutory copyright prohibition against
copying the letter, for reasons discussed below, that general prohibition would not likely apply in the
context of a casual email correspondence. See infra Part III.A–C.
133. Widdemer, 19 Pa. C. at 264–65.
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address each individual recipient, the author retains a right of first
publication as to each letter recipient, regardless of whether the other
recipients receive the identical expression. For example, consider an
author who sends an identical letter, which perhaps complains generally
about working conditions at large corporations, to three different
corporate executives, each addressed to “Dear Corporate Executive.”
The author retains an interest in maintaining privacy of expression that
the author has made to each executive, even where the author specifies in
the letter that the author is sending an identical letter to all three
executives. The executives receive a letter that is intended to address
them—not merely reiterate an expression made to a different person.
Thus, the fact that the author sends identical expressions to multiple
recipients should not detract from the privacy interest that the author
holds as to the same individual expression sent to each recipient. In the
email context, the same reasoning applies. Even though a sender may
transmit an identical expression to each “to” field recipient, for purposes
of the email sender’s interest in maintaining privacy, the email sender
has effectively written individual identical emails to each recipient. The
author retains a right of first publication with respect to the multiple
emails received by the respective multiple email recipients. Multiple
“to” field recipients merit multiple instances of privacy protection.
Although the presence of multiple “to” field recipients does not
suggest that the sender relinquishes the right of first publication, a
contrary conclusion arises where a sender designates a recipient in the
“carbon copy” field. Carbon copying (or blind carbon copying)
constitutes copying the expression sent to the intended recipient listed in
the “to” field and sending that copy to a third party to observe. An email
sender who carbon copies someone is analogous to an author of a letter
who copies the letter, stamps the letter with the word “copy,” and then
sends the original to a recipient and the stamped copy to a different
recipient for review. The express label of “copy” stamped on a letter
sent to a party other than the letter’s intended recipient would evidence a
finding that the author intended to copy and distribute the expression
meant for the intended recipient, or in other words, that the author
published it. The author would not have intended for the expression in
the copy to be addressed to, or apply to, the third-party recipient.
In the email context, the carbon-copy feature electronically stamps
the carbon-copy recipient’s email with a mark indicating that the sender
intended to make a copy of the original email and distribute it to a party
other than the intended recipient. It evidences an intent to create a copy
for the purpose of third-party review or observation. That is, the
electronic carbon-copy stamp suggests that the sender does not intend for
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the email expression to apply to the carbon-copy recipient, but rather
intends for the carbon-copy recipient to receive a record of the
expression sent to the “to” field recipient. Common-law copyright rules
therefore suggest that an email sender relinquishes the right of first
publication when the sender includes a carbon-copy or blind-carboncopy recipient in the email.
The distinction that common-law copyright draws between multiple
“to” field recipients and a “carbon copy” recipient warrants criticism.
An email sender may intend for the email expression to apply to a
carbon-copy recipient as much as the sender intends for the email to
apply to multiple “to” field recipients. Perhaps the sender desires to
separate two recipients by placing them in the separate “to” and “carbon
copy” fields because the visual appearance of two names separated
vertically is easier to identify than is the appearance of two names
separated by a semicolon in a horizontal string. Perhaps a sender desires
to send the same email to multiple recipients without revealing any
recipient’s identity to any other recipient. In that circumstance, the
sender might designate himself as the “to” field recipient, and then
designate all other intended recipients in the blind-carbon-copy field.
The email text would not indicate that the message was directed to a
specific recipient. Hence, in view of the purposes for which senders
employ the carbon-copy (and blind-carbon-copy) field, the mere use of
that field should not necessarily suggest relinquishment of the right of
first publication. Use of the carbon-copy field does not necessarily
suggest that the sender intends for the email expression to apply only to
the recipients listed in the “to” field and not to those listed in the carboncopy field.
This criticism has merit. Where the content of the email indicates
that the sender intends for the content of the email to apply to the carboncopy field recipient as much as the “to” field recipient, the fact that the
sender employs the carbon-copy field should not imply that the sender
has relinquished the right of first publication. Ultimately the issue of
whether publication to a third party has occurred—or in other words the
issue of relinquishment—raises a question of fact contingent upon a
sender’s intent. Nevertheless, where the content does not expressly
indicate that the expression applies to the carbon-copy recipient, the fact
that the sender has employed the carbon-copy feature should create at
least a presumption of relinquishment. Standing alone, carbon copy
indicates an intent to publish: it functions as a discrete indicator of an
intent to copy and distribute the email to a third party for the purpose of
making the expression which was sent to the “to” field recipient known
to that third party. Use of this feature presumptively establishes an intent
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by the sender to relinquish the right of first publication.134 Only if
circumstances demonstrate otherwise should the carbon-copy feature not
be viewed as evidence of relinquishment by the sender.
B. Rights of Email Recipients
The common law endows letter recipients with property rights,135
which implies that email recipients also hold property rights. Once
delivery occurs, the letter recipient receives by gift property rights to
possess the physical components of the letter: the physical paper, the
envelope, the ink, and the postage stamp.136 So while copyright secures
an author property rights in the letter’s expression, property law secures
the recipient property rights to the physical components of the letter.137
Other than publishing the letter, a recipient may exercise all rights
over a physical letter inherent in personal property.138 The recipient may
preserve the letter against the wishes of its author.139 Further, the
recipient may dispose of the letter by destroying, selling, or otherwise

134. By contrast, a recipient’s use of the “forward” feature does not suggest that the sender has
relinquished the right of first publication. Assuming that the sender does not forward the email, the
forwarding label evidences the recipient’s intent to copy and distribute the email expression.
Relinquishment of the right of first publication hinges upon the intent of the sender—not the intent
of the recipient. Accordingly, if a recipient forwards an email, the sender retains his right of first
publication.
135. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912) (“The author parts with the
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope. These are given to the
receiver.”); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (recognizing the English
common-law principle that “the receiver of letters has only a special or qualified property, confined
to the material on which they are written, and not extended to the letters as expressive of the mind of
the writer”).
136. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (“[T]he unqualified delivery
of the letter [is] adjudged a gift of all the author’s right to it, except his right to publish if existing,
and to prevent the publication of it without his consent.”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111–12 (declaring that
the material elements “conveyed by and in the envelope . . . are given to the receiver” such that “the
right in the receiver of an ordinary letter is one of unqualified title in the material on which it is
written”); Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. 198, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (“We must . . . presume a
grant of the letters from him to her.”); see also Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (relating, without
objecting to, the assumption of a litigant’s argument that “sending of letter is in the nature of a gift to
the receiver”).
137. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (teaching that a letter recipient has rights to the physical
components of a letter “as absolute owner subject only to the proprietary right retained by the author
for himself and his representatives to the publication or nonpublication of ideas in its particular
verbal expression”).
138. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may rightfully make any use of the
letter which will not, in the same sense, amount to publication . . . .” (emphasis added)).
139. See id. at 484 (“By sending [the letters], the authors parted with their right to the
possession, control, or reclamation of them without [the recipient’s] consent, and gave her the
exclusive right to read and keep them for their enduring memories and sentiments.”).
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transferring it.140 It is noteworthy that transferring the letter does
impinge on the author’s interest in maintaining privacy: through transfer,
an unintended third party gains permanent access to the author’s
expression.
The reason that transfer is permissible despite its
encroachment on the author’s privacy interest appears to be that the
recipient’s property rights over the physical letter are absolute.141 When
the author gives the letter to the recipient, the author parts with rights to
the letter’s physical components, and the recipient becomes the rightful
owner.142 As rightful owner of the letter, the recipient is not subject to
restraints on alienation.143 In short, a person’s right of alienation in
personal property appears to be a stronger legal interest than is the
interest of protecting another person’s right to maintain expressive
privacy.144 Alienability appears to be a stronger interest than privacy.145
At the cost of invading a degree of the author’s privacy, then, the
recipient may transfer the letter.
These common-law principles governing property rights to a
physical letter imply that an intended email recipient holds property
rights in the electronic computer file that constitutes the email. The
sender transmits the computer file to the recipient, and that file gives rise
to the evanescent display on the computer screen.146 As owner of the
computer file, the recipient may preserve the file on a storage device, or
alternatively, dispose of the file.147 Disposal by destruction is apparent:

140. See id. at 486 (“[T]his general property implies the right in the recipient to keep the letter or
to destroy it, or to dispose of it in any other way than by publication . . . .”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 112
(“[An author]’s proprietary power is to make or to restrain a publication, but not to prevent a
transfer.”).
141. Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 486; Baker, 97 N.E. at 112.
142. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (describing a recipient’s rights to the letter).
143. See Dyer v. Dyer, 566 S.E.2d 665, 668 (Ga. 2002) (“‘It is the policy of the law to encourage
free alienability of property, and attempts to remove either land or chattels from circulation in trade
are discouraged . . . by the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.’” (quoting Leathers v.
McClain, 338 S.E.2d 666, 667 (Ga. 1986))).
144. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 489 cmt. a (1944) (“The policy of the law has been, in
general, in favor of a high degree of alienability of property interests. This policy arises from a
belief that the social interest is promoted by the greater utilization of the subject matter of property
resulting from the freedom of alienation of interests in it.”); cf. Jessica Litman, Information
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1296–1301 (2000) (arguing that a propertybased theory to further privacy must fail because property necessarily requires rights of alienability,
which fosters exchange, and exchange contravenes privacy).
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing alienability and privacy in terms of
property interests).
146. See Brain, supra note 118 (describing the email process).
147. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (discussing right of recipient
of a letter “to keep the letter or to destroy it, or to dispose of it”); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112
(Mass. 1912) (discussing letter recipient’s right to deal with the letter as “absolute owner”).
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the recipient simply deletes the file. Disposal by sale or other transfer
merits further discussion.148
1. The Right to Transfer Email
Permissible email transfer by a recipient requires a physical transfer
of the email computer file. Because the recipient holds property rights in
the computer file, rather than the expression within the email, the
recipient may not simply forward the email to effect a transfer.149 By
forwarding an email, the original email recipient makes a reproduction of
the expression in the email, and the right to reproduce the expression is
not within the bundle of rights that the recipient holds in the physical
components of the letter.150 A recipient may therefore exercise the right
to transfer the email file only if the transfer results in physical movement
of the file to the transferee.151 A permissible transfer must be a physical
transfer.
Physical transfer of email raises several complexities. Email files
exist within physical storage devices.152 Specifically, an email could
exist on a recipient’s hard drive where the email client, e.g., Outlook
Express, has saved the file sent from the email server, or alternatively, an
email could exist on the email server accessible through the Internet.153
Physical transfer in the former situation—the email file existing on the
recipient’s hard drive—requires that the recipient physically transfer the
hard drive on which Outlook Express originally saved the email file. If
the email file exists only on the hard drive, the recipient physically
controls the email only to the extent that the recipient is able to control
the hard drive on which the file exists. A physical transfer would
therefore require a transfer of the hard drive.
The second situation—the email file existing on the email server—
raises a complexity under the physical transfer requirement. The email
file on the email server would belong to the recipient, but the storage
148. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing rights of email recipients to transfer emails).
149. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing email forwarding).
150. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing email forwarding). The fact that an email recipient
might forward the original email expression as an attachment rather than as inline text does not
affect the argument that the email recipient does not hold a right to reproduce that original
expression. Regardless of its digital form, the original expression belongs to the original email
sender.
151. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (discussing letter recipient’s right to deposit letters at a
place of recipient’s choosing); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 57–58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855)
(discussing letter recipient’s rights to control only the material on which expression is written).
152. See Brain, supra note 118 (explaining how email works on the Internet).
153. See id. (explaining the mechanics of how email clients and servers work).
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device on which that file is saved would belong to the owner of the email
server, an internet service provider. In that situation, the recipient’s
circumstance would be analogous to that of a building owner whose
building lies on land of a separate landowner.154 Just as the building
owner uses and leases the land on which the building lies from a
landowner, an email recipient stores email files on and rents server space
from an internet service provider.155 And just as the building owner
cannot transfer title to the land underlying the building, the email
recipient cannot transfer title to the server on which the recipient’s email
is saved.156 Instead, the building owner and email recipient may transfer
rights of dominion and control over their respective properties.157 To be
effective, the transfers must be subject to the property rights of the
respective landowner and an internet service provider.158
Like a transfer of email stored on a hard drive, a transfer of email
stored on a server belonging to an internet service provider must be
absolute.159 The email recipient who accesses email through an email
server on the Internet, e.g., Yahoo!, must transfer his or her lease to the
server space corresponding to the email that the recipient seeks to
transfer. In the analogous situation of the building owner, the building
owner must transfer rights to lease the underlying land if the building
owner is to effect a complete transfer of all rights to the building.160 The
circumstances of the email context, however, preclude the email
recipient from transferring only the leased server space that corresponds
to a single email.161 Internet service providers do not fragment email
accounts.162 If an email recipient desires to transfer server space

154. See, e.g., Adams v. Shirk, 104 F. 54, 59–60 (7th Cir. 1900) (recognizing the conceptual
distinction between property held by owner of a building and property held by owner of land on
which the building sits).
155. See id. at 60 (discussing lease situation).
156. See id. (discussing lessee’s inability to transfer land underlying leased building).
157. See id. (discussing right to transfer).
158. See id. (stating that transfer of lease is subject to property rights of respective landowner).
159. See Grimsley v. Grimsley, 632 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting attempted
transfer of property in the absence of relinquishment of total dominion and control by transferor).
160. See Adams, 104 F. at 60 (stating it was not in lessee’s power “to compel the desired
forfeiture or his own discharge through the enforced acceptance of a substitute”).
161. The mechanics of email preclude email-account fracturing. The email-website operator,
which acts as the internet server through which the email is received, creates one single computer
file on which multiple email messages may exist. See Brain, supra note 118 (“As other people sent
mail to [the recipient], the server would simply append those messages to the bottom of the file in
the order that they arrived. The [email] text file would accumulate a series of five or 10 messages . .
. .”).
162. E.g., 2006 Yahoo! Terms of Service, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms (last visited Aug. 1,
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Yahoo! Terms of Service].
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corresponding to a particular email, the recipient must transfer all the
server space constituting the email account.163 A recipient must sign
over the rights to the email-website account containing the email. For
example, a Yahoo! subscriber could transfer an email sent to the
subscriber’s Yahoo! email address only if the subscriber transferred all
rights to the entire Yahoo! account.164 The transferee could then bar the
original recipient from accessing the account, so the transfer would be
absolute.
It should be noted that technology provides a means for realizing the
same outcome of transferring email which is much less cumbersome than
the two means of transfer discussed above. Forwarding and deleting an
email is easier than detaching and delivering a hard drive or signing over
an email account. An argument exists that email forwarding and deletion
should replace these more difficult means of email transfer. The
argument is one of efficiency. The transaction cost is high where the
recipient must physically transfer the email file; indeed, the costs of
delivering a hard drive or signing over an email account can altogether
prevent the transfer. By contrast, the same result of the email being
transferred to a third party and the original recipient not holding a copy
of the email can be realized by a much simpler and less costly means:
forwarding and deleting the email. If a recipient simply forwards and
deletes the email, the effect is the same as though the recipient were to
provide the third party the actual physical copy of the email file on the
recipient’s hard drive or the contract rights to the recipient’s email
account. Forwarding and deleting has the same effect as physical
transfer. The original email recipient is left with no physical record of
the email expression, so from a pragmatic perspective, the third party’s
copy appears to be a transfer. An argument thus exists that the
technological means of email forwarding and deletion should replace the
archaic requirement of physically delivering to the third party the
original email that the recipient received from the sender.

163. See supra note 161.
164. An issue arises as to whether an email recipient may permissibly transfer rights of use to an
email-website account. Some email-website operators contractually prohibit such transfer. See, e.g.,
Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 162 (noting that the Yahoo! Account is nontransferable).
Whether those terms are enforceable is an issue outside the scope of this Article. It nevertheless
should be noted that such a contractual prohibition would represent a restraint on alienation with
respect to the email recipient’s property rights to the email file contained on the Yahoo! server. The
common law disfavors such restraints on alienation. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (“[T]o impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions would ‘violate the
ancient rule against restraints on alienation.’” (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 380 (1966), overruled on other grounds by Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 58)).
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This argument for transfer by email forwarding and deletion would
not likely succeed. The recipient may permissibly transfer the email
without invading the sender’s privacy only because the recipient holds
absolute property rights to the physical components of the email.165 Any
copies of the email expression, even if the original email is deleted, fall
within the scope of the sender’s rights to control the expression.
Accordingly, although forwarding and deleting email may effect the
same result as transferring rights to the physical email file that the
recipient originally received, forwarding is not within the scope of
property rights that an email recipient holds in the physical file. Transfer
can occur only by exercising rights to the physical components of the
email, for that is the only subject matter over which the recipient holds
property rights. This means that the transfer must occur in either one of
two ways: (1) a physical transfer of the storage device on which the
recipient’s computer originally saved the file;166 or (2) a transfer of the
contractual right to the email account containing the physical email file.
The fact that technology provides means for realizing the same outcome
is of no consequence. Transferring the expression by reproducing it
would constitute an unwarranted infringement of the sender’s right to
control the expression.
2. The Right to Display Email
Another common-law rule governing letters is that a letter recipient
may show the letter to others.167 Authority exists for the proposition that
the recipient may display the letter to as many persons as the recipient
desires, insofar as the recipient does not make copies of the letter.168
This right to display arises out of the recipient’s property rights in the
physical components of the letter, which allow the recipient to control

165. See Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (opining that a letter
recipient holds property rights over the physical components of the letter); Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E.
109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (same).
166. Transfer of the storage device on which the file exists does not permit the email recipient to
save the file onto a different storage device for the purpose of effecting a permissible transfer. That
is, an email recipient may not copy the email file from the storage device on which the email was
originally saved (e.g., the recipient’s hard drive) onto a different storage device (e.g., a floppy disk)
for the purpose of effecting a physical transfer of the email file.
167. See Baker, 97 N.E. at 112 (dictum) (noting that with regard to a recipient’s rights over
letters, “there must be inferred a right of reading or showing to a more or less limited circle of
friends and relatives”).
168. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[Plaintiff]’s letters
are unpublished, and they have not lost that attribute by their placement in libraries . . . .”).
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the physical possession, and thereby location, of the letter.169 If a
recipient were not allowed to show the letter to others, the recipient’s
right to control the physical location of the letter would be severely
restricted. To uphold the recipient’s property rights to the physical
components of the letter, common-law copyright recognizes that a
recipient may place the letter in a physical location for other persons to
view.170
This common-law principle implies that an email recipient may
display the email to others. The issue arises, then, as to whether there are
limitations on the method for displaying the email. Most akin to
displaying a physical letter would be displaying an email to a third party
while the email is visible on a computer screen. A screen display does
not affect the email file on the recipient’s hard drive or internet email
account. That method of display instead requires any third party to be
present at the computer on which the recipient may access the email.171
This method appears most similar to the circumstances surrounding a
letter recipient showing the letter to a third party because it requires that
the letter be physically located in proximity to the third party. Screen
display of a recipient’s email appears permissible under the common
law.
Other methods of display are possible. A recipient might post the
email on a website, might provide a third party access to the recipient’s
email account, might print the email and show the third party that copy,
or might print the email and give the third party that copy. The issue of
whether these methods are permissible under the common law is
discussed in the following two subparts.
a. Email Display on a Website
Consistent with common-law recognition that a letter recipient may
place the letter at any physical location for others to view, it has been
held that a recipient may publicly display the letter by placing it in a

169. See id. at 94–95 (“Having ownership of the physical document, the recipient . . . is entitled
to deposit it with a library . . . .”); Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (discussing recipient’s right to
deposit letters at a place of recipient’s choosing).
170. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may read the letters to a friend or
deposit them for safe-keeping without violating the author’s right of publication.”).
171. It is possible for an email recipient whose email is stored on an email server to view the
email through the Internet while using a third party’s computer in order to show the email to the
third party. That situation would be analogous to providing a third party access to the email account
on which the email is stored, which is addressed in Part II.B.2.a.
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library.172 In view of this holding, the question arises as to whether an
email recipient may publicly display the email by either posting it to a
website or by making available the password to access a website email
account that contains the email. At first glance, the library and the two
website situations seem analogous. All persons interested in viewing an
email may view the email on a website much like they could view it at a
library. Displaying the email through a website seems to be like making
it available at a public forum, much like a library.
This argument for website display should not succeed. The library
analogy fails due to a substantive distinction arising between the fora of
cyberspace and physical space. With respect to either a publicly
available website or a website email account like Yahoo!, the computers
of all persons who view the email on the website must produce a copy of
that email display in their computers’ memory.173 Courts have held that
computer memory is a medium on which infringing copies may be
made.174 Accordingly, a copy of an email that is made by a computer
that is not under the control of the intended recipient—whether that copy
be made by accessing the recipient’s email account or by accessing a
website—results in an unauthorized publication of the email. By
providing others access to an email account, or by simply posting the
email on a publicly available website, the recipient facilitates for others a
means to reproduce copies of the expression.175 Displaying email on a
website or providing others access to an email account appears to violate
the right of first publication.176
172. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (“[Plaintiff]’s letters are unpublished, and they have not lost
that attribute by their placement in libraries . . . .”).
173. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1395, 1397 (1996) (“[D]igital expression cannot be accessed without being copied into computer
memory . . . .”); see also Marshall Brain, How Web Pages Work, http://
computer.howstuffworks.com/web-page5.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (explaining process for
posting graphics files on a website).
174. See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(finding that the defendant had illegally reproduced elements of the copyrighted work “insofar [as
the] elements were reproduced into RAM”); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a computer’s RAM constituted a fixed form of a work); Advanced
Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding
that RAM is “sufficiently ‘fixed’ to constitute a ‘copy’ under the Act”). These cases have arisen
under the Copyright Act, but seem just as applicable under a common-law standard. There is no
reason or authority supporting the argument that common-law copyright and federal copyright have
different rules regarding the material on which a copy may be made to constitute a “copy.”
175. Making a letter available to the public in a library would be analogous to the website
circumstances described above if in the library context the letter recipient made available the letter
for library patrons for the sole purpose of patrons themselves making a copy of the letter at the
library.
176. With respect to posting an email on a publicly available website, the argument that the
website functions as a public forum for display fails for another reason. The procedure for posting
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Admittedly this response to the argument for website display relies
on a very technical computer process. It seems to employ a technicality
to escape the inevitable consequence of allowing public display in the
digital age.
b. Email Display on Physical Paper
The question of whether an email recipient may display an email that
the recipient prints on paper raises a preliminary issue of whether the
recipient may even print the email. The common law suggests that
printing is permissible.177 As stated above, the common law definition of
publication is the circulation of any number of copies.178 The act of
printing email does not necessarily result in circulation; it does not
necessarily result in privacy invasion.179 If a recipient holds both the
original electronic version of the expression and additional paper copies,
but never exposes the copies to any third party, the email sender’s
privacy remains unaffected.180 Because email printing itself does not
result in a deprivation of privacy, it appears permissible for a recipient to
make a physical copy of the sender’s electronic expression.
The question next arises as to whether the recipient may show the
printed email to a third party. Privacy interests of the sender favor the
view that the only means for an email recipient to permissibly show the
an email on such a website requires that a copy of the email be made for display on the website. See
sources cited supra note 173. That is, the email recipient does not display the actual original email
that he or she received from the email sender when the recipient posts it to a website. The recipient
must make and distribute a copy of the sender’s expression in order to post the email on a website.
177. In Grigsby v. Breckinridge, the court stated: “[A letter recipient] may do every thing but
multiply copies, and perhaps he may do this, if he do [sic] not print them.” 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 489
(1867) (internal quotations omitted). This statement would not make sense unless there were a
distinction between multiplying copies and printing copies. It is therefore likely that “multiplying”
copies denotes copying by hand but not distributing those copies to third parties, whereas “printing”
copies denotes copying by machine for the purpose of third-party distribution.
178. See id. at 488 (“Publication by the author is circulation before the public eye by printing or
multiplied copies in writing.” (emphasis added)); accord Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N.E. 604,
605–06 (Mass. 1927) (holding that copies of letter made by author, which author did not distribute,
did not impair the property rights of the author); see also Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Pa. C. 263, 264–
65 (C.P. 1887) (holding that letter author had made publication by sending the letter to two thirdparty recipients in addition to its intended recipient).
179. Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488.
180. See id. (stating that the recipient may make any use of the letter which does not amount to
publication). It is entirely plausible that a recipient would print a paper copy of the email without
distributing it to a third party: recipients often prefer to read text on paper rather than on a computer
screen, and evidence exists that reading words on paper is more efficient than on screens. See
generally Andrew Dillon, Reading from Paper Versus Screens: A Critical Review of the Empirical
Literature, 35 ERGONOMICS 1297 (1992) (discussing numerous issues relating to reading computer
screens versus reading on paper).
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email is to show it on a computer screen. By restricting the means for
viewing the expression, a recipient might decrease the number of people
to whom the recipient would likely show the expression. On the other
hand, property interests of the paper owner suggest that the owner may
exercise full control over the paper on which the copy is printed. The
property rights attaching to the paper would appear to be the same before
printing the email as after printing the email; so if the email recipient
prints the email on paper belonging to either the recipient or a third party,
it seems that the recipient or that third party then may exercise full
control over that printed email. The paper owner arguably may show it
to anyone.
A clear resolution of these competing interests of privacy and
property is not readily apparent.181 The argument that the recipient
should not be able to show the printed copy is simply that the recipient’s
right to print email should not be extended in a manner that decreases the
sender’s privacy. The basis for the recipient’s right to print the email is
that the act of printing does not result in a deprivation of privacy. This
basis would be ineffective if the recipient could display the printed copy
to others. It is possible, then, that the email recipient receives a right to
print the email subject to a restriction that the printed copy may not be
displayed to a third party. Duplication of the expression would be
permitted only to the extent that it does not decrease the sender’s
privacy. By printing the email, the recipient arguably exchanges the
right to display and the right to transfer the paper on which the email is
printed for the right to make a physical copy of the email expression.
A counterargument exists to this argument against displaying and
transferring printed copies. It is that the recipient never bargains with the
sender to print the email, so the recipient holds absolute property rights
over the printed copy.182 This counterargument posits that the recipient’s
right to print the email stems from the fact that printing email is a
common practice. Because the practice is so universally accepted, it is
arguable that the sender implicitly consents to the practice by the very
fact that the sender transmits email. The consent would mean that the
sender cannot control the physical paper on which the expression is
printed. It would mean that the paper copy of the email may be

181. The common law has not addressed an analogous situation in the letter context, likely
because in the context of letters during the nineteenth century it would have been easier to display
the expression by simply showing the actual letter rather than by copying the letter and then showing
that copy.
182. See Grigsby, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 488 (“[T]he recipient may rightfully make any use of the
letter which will not, in the same sense, amount to publication . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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displayed, and for that matter transferred, without regard to the sender’s
privacy interest. The copy of the email on physical paper arguably
belongs as much to the email recipient as the email computer file belongs
to the recipient.
This counterargument is persuasive. Although an email sender’s
interest in privacy suggests that it would be advisable to limit the uses of
the printed copy, it is unlikely that the sender could impose such a
restriction. The common practice of email appears to compel an email
sender to allow the recipient to print the email. In a sense, the email
sender qualifies his or her right of expression by the mere fact that the
sender uses email: to the extent the recipient does not publish the
expression, the recipient may print the email on paper over which the
recipient may exercise dominion and control. That dominion and control
includes showing and transferring the paper.
A pragmatic problem with this reasoning is that if an email recipient
may transfer the printed copy of the email, then the recipient may publish
the expression therein. Likewise, if the recipient prints the email on
paper belonging to someone else, publication results. The recipient’s
seeming right to print a hard copy of the email, in conjunction with the
absolute property rights that the paper owner holds over the paper on
which the recipient prints the email, leads to the outcome that the
recipient is able to publish the expression. The recipient can simply
transfer title of the printed copy to a third party, retain the electronic file,
and thereby undermine the sender’s right of first publication.183
Alternatively, the recipient can simply print the email on paper belonging
to a third party.
This pragmatic problem is resolvable. The common-law principle
that a letter recipient “has only a special or qualified property” right
suggests that the recipient’s physical property rights in the email exist
only to the extent that those rights preserve an email sender’s rights to
control duplication and distribution of the sender’s expression.184
Consistent with this principle, the property rights in the physical printed
copy of the email should be tied to those in the email computer file.185 If
both a paper form and an electronic form of the expression exist, they
183. A similar argument could be made in situations where the email recipient retains a copy of
the email on the recipient’s hard drive and on an email server. See supra Part II.A.2.b. (discussing
limits on common-law right of first publication in the email context). The recipient could simply
transfer title to the hard drive and retain the copy on the email server.
184. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
185. This resolution would apply to the analogous argument raised, supra, in note 183: an email
recipient could transfer title to the hard drive only if the recipient transferred title to the email
account on the email server along with it.
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must exist together. This would mean that a recipient may print an email
on paper belonging to another, but only if the paper owner transfers title
to the email recipient upon printing. Similarly, the printed copy may be
transferred to a third party, but only if the physical email file is
transferred along with it. Bundling together the property rights to the
physical email file and the printed copy preserves a recipient’s right to
control the physical nature of the email and the printed copy, yet it also
subjects those rights to the sender’s rights of expression. Bundling
would maintain the sender’s privacy. Accordingly, transfer of the email
computer file should require the transfer of the paper copy, and likewise,
a transfer of the paper copy should require the transfer of the email
computer file. Because the recipient does not retain property rights to an
electronic or paper form of the expression when the recipient transfers
both forms, no two persons could hold property rights to a physical
manifestation of the expression. There would be no publication. Thus,
the physical property rights of a printed email copy should be tied to
those of the physical property rights of the email computer file.
3. Rights of Unintended Email Recipients
Up to this point the discussion regarding the rights of email
recipients has relied on the assumption that the recipients of email were
in fact the intended recipients of the email. But that is not always true.
Email senders often mistakenly input an incorrect email address in the
“to” field such that the email address entered does not identify the person
whom the sender intends to receive the email. Occasionally, such a
mistaken email address corresponds to an email address of an actual
person.186 Email is sent to unintended recipients. The question arises,
then, whether unintended recipients of email hold property rights in the
email.
This question is easily answered under simple principles of gift law
and finders law. As stated above, a letter recipient receives property
rights to the letter by gift from the letter author.187 To gift personal
property to a person, a donor must deliver the property to the intended
donee.188 Delivery occurs where the gift donor has done “all that
186. See, e.g., Posting of Jeff Carlson to Jeff Carlson (. Thought), http://jeffcarlson.typepad.com/
thought/2005/06/misdirected_ema.html (June 13, 2005, 10:36) (“I frequently receive misdirected
email intended for New England Coffee Company because they’re necoffeeco.com, while I’m
necoffee.com.”).
187. See supra note 136 (noting that delivery of a letter is a gift of all of the author’s rights,
excluding publication).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (stating that
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normally could be done” under the circumstances to put the intended
donee in control of the personal property.189 This means that for a sender
to transfer property rights in the email to the intended recipient, the
sender must do all that normally could be done to put the intended
recipient in possession of the email.190 All that normally could be done
includes typing the correct email address of the intended recipient in the
“to” field. Delivery never occurs, then, where the sender inputs an
incorrect email address. The actual recipient must therefore be the
intended recipient for the actual recipient to hold property rights in the
email under gift law.
Although an unintended recipient holds no property rights in the
email under gift law, an issue arises as to whether the unintended
recipient may assert property rights over the email by virtue of the fact
that the unintended recipient is in possession of the email. In
establishing property rights, “[p]ossession is very strong; rather more
than nine points of the law.”191 An unintended recipient could therefore
argue that mere possession of the email bestows property rights.
Although it was not a gift, in the recipient’s inbox the email exists, and
that—according to an unintended recipient—should be sufficient.
This argument would not likely prevail. The email sent to an
unintended recipient is essentially an item that the sender mistakenly
causes to exist in a different location than intended. Stated another way,
the email is a lost item. The unintended recipient is therefore a finder of
lost property.192 And although it is lost, the physical email file has not
been abandoned.193 Finders of lost, but not abandoned, property hold
property as against all others but the true owner.194 Therefore, the sender
retains property rights to the email computer file even after the sender
mistakenly addresses and sends the email to the unintended recipient.195
for a gift to be valid, the donor must deliver the personal property “to the donee with the manifested
intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property”).
189. Id. § 31.1 cmt. b.
190. See id. (discussing what constitutes delivery).
191. Corp. of Kingston-up-Hull v. Horner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (K.B.).
192. See id. (contemplating the possibility that a finding may occur with respect to property that
is intended to be gifted).
193. See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506–07 (1871) (holding that plaintiff did not
abandon property rights to manure that plaintiff left in the street, which defendant attempted to take
possession of).
194. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.).
195. It should be noted that the recipient acts as a finder of lost property, and as a finder, the
recipient does hold property rights against all persons who are neither the intended recipient nor the
original sender. See id. (“[T]he finder of a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an
absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all
but the rightful owner . . . .”).
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The fact that the sender retains title to the physical email file sent to
an unintended recipient suggests that if the email sender requests the
unintended recipient to destroy the email, the unintended recipient is
obligated to comply with that demand. Contrary to popular belief that
email disclaimers are of no legal effect,196 an email disclaimer that
requests an unintended recipient to destroy an email does appear to merit
legal recognition: gift law and finders law imply that the email sender
retains a property interest in the email.197 The following simple email
notice appears to have legal effect: “If you are not the intended recipient
of this email, the email sender requests that you destroy this email.”198
Because the unintended recipient never receives a property right superior
to the email sender, the unintended recipient must comply by deleting the
email.199
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT’S FAILURE TO PROTECT EMAIL EXPRESSION
In 1976, Congress passed the Copyright Act.200 The Act purports to
provide a right of first publication to authors,201 and further states that it
preempts all other law that provides “equivalent” rights.202 At first
glance, the Act’s codification of a right of first publication appears to
mirror the common-law principle of protecting privacy interests in
196. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“People who send email from disclaimer-laden corporate
accounts are roundly mocked; unless the email is obviously and intrinsically not meant for certain
eyes, disclaimers are next to useless.”).
197. Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 31.1 (1992) (“The owner of personal property may make a gift thereof to another
person (the donee) by delivering it to the donee, or to a third person for the donee, with the
manifested intention that the donee be the owner of the personal property.”).
198. Martin H. Myers, Cyber-Ethics 2002: Professional Responsibility and Evolving
Technology, 701 PRACTISING L. INST. 977, 994 (2002) (providing similar email disclaimer).
199. The fact that rules of personal property law, such as gift law, govern property rights to
physical email files suggests that it is possible for an unintended email recipient to gain property
rights to the email. Personal property may be acquired through adverse possession. See Lightfoot v.
Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1910) (“[I]t seems to be the generally accepted doctrine that by
adverse possession title to chattels may be acquired which will be paramount to that of the true
owner.”); cf. Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 451 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(contemplating possibility that intangible property may be acquired through adverse possession).
Title by adverse possession arises where possession is open and notorious. Lightfoot, 91 N.E. at
584–85. Accordingly, if an unintended email recipient notifies the sender of the recipient’s receipt
of the email, and if the sender fails to request that the unintended recipient return or destroy the
email, then after the time period applicable for adverse possession, the unintended recipient would
arguably gain title to the physical email file.
200. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000)).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
202. Id. § 301(a).

SNOW FINAL.DOC

540

7/15/2007 3:48:30 PM

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

unpublished works.203 On further examination, however, the Act appears
markedly different from the common-law doctrines that protect privacy.
Unlike the common law, the Act provides a fair-use defense that may
apply regardless of whether the author has decided to publish the
work.204 A weighty criterion of the fair-use defense is whether the use
harmfully affects the potential market for the work.205 Because casual
email expression usually has no market potential, such expression would
likely fall outside the scope of federal copyright protection.206
This Part analyzes whether the Copyright Act applies to private
email expression. Part III.A analyzes the relevant provisions of the Act
in the email context and concludes that the Act would likely not protect
email expression. Part III.B examines the caselaw and legislative history
that deal with application of the Act to unpublished works and
determines that these sources support the conclusion that the Act fails to
protect email. Part III.C discusses the theoretical tension that arises by
interpreting the Act, including its fair-use defense as it applies to works
that are never intended to be published, such as email. Part III.D argues
that the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution restricts the Act
to govern only rights that further a utilitarian purpose; that the commonlaw right of first publication furthers only an author’s privacy interest;
that this common-law right which protects private email expression falls
outside the preemptive scope of the Act; and that the centuries-old
common-law doctrines that have protected private letters today protect
private emails.
A. A Statutory Analysis of Exclusive Rights and Fair Use
The Copyright Act provides an author exclusive rights that are
subject to a defense of fair use.207 This subpart analyzes the rights
203. Id. § 106(3) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
204. Id. § 107.
205. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (describing the
effect-on-the-market criterion as “the single most important element of fair use”).
206. Because the Act concerns only rights that an author holds in an expression, the Act does not
change the dual nature of the property rights to a letter, and therefore email. See discussion supra
Part II.B. Regardless of whether the Act applies to email, an intended recipient does hold property
rights in the physical email file, and an unintended recipient does not. See discussion supra Part
II.B.
207. Emails appear to fall within the defined subject matter of the Copyright Act. The Act
applies to “original works of authorship,” and an “original work of authorship” includes “literary
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). “Literary works” is defined to mean works that are “expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards,
in which they are embodied.” Id. § 101.
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relevant to the email context and then discusses whether the fair-use
doctrine protects otherwise infringing uses. It concludes that fair use
protects a recipient’s use of casual email correspondence.
1. Exclusive Rights Under the Copyright Act
The exclusive rights relevant to the email context include: (1) the
right to reproduce a work; (2) the right to distribute copies of a work “to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending”; and (3) the right to display a work publicly.208 The first
enumerated right constitutes a straightforward prohibition against
reproduction.209 Reproducing a work even without distributing that
reproduction to a third party violates this right.210 Therefore, printing an
email, without transferring it, violates this right. Indeed, both printing
and forwarding email constitute illegal reproductions of the email
expression.211
The second enumerated right—the right to distribute copies of a
work to the public—is referred to in the Statutory Notes of the Act as the
“Public Distribution” right.212 Those Notes state that the Public
Distribution right “establishes the exclusive right of publication.”213 The
Notes state:
Under this provision [concerning the federal right of publication] the
copyright owner would have the right to control the first public
distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work, whether by sale, gift,
loan, or some rental or lease arrangement. Likewise, any unauthorized
One requirement to receive copyright protection under the Act is that works must be “fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id. § 102(a). A computer file
constitutes a sufficiently tangible medium of expression to fulfill the requirement for protection. See
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding computer files are fixed
in a tangible medium of expression).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The other exclusive rights comprise: the right “to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work”; the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly”; and
in the case of sound recordings, the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.” Id.
209. See id. § 106(1) (providing the owner of a copyright with exclusive rights to the
reproduction of the copyrighted work).
210. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 787 n.54 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[C], at 8-32 (1998))
(noting that copying a protected work results in a violation of the exclusive right of reproduction
“even if it is used solely for the private purposes of the reproducer”).
211. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (stating the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to
reproduction of the work).
212. Id. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
213. Id.
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public distribution of copies . . . that were unlawfully made would be
an infringement.214

This right thus appears to be the federal analogue to the common-law
right of first publication.215 It allows an author to control the first
publication, prohibiting unauthorized public distribution of copies.216
Consistent with the common-law right of first publication, the Act
further provides that the federal right of first publication ceases once the
author has parted with ownership of the copy.217
Despite the seeming similarity between this federal right of first
publication and the common-law right of first publication, the two rights
are substantively distinct. Distributing a single copy of a work does not
appear to constitute a publication under the federal right of first
publication, whereas it would under the common-law right of first
publication.218 Distribution of a single copy, or even a few copies, would
not likely be sufficient to constitute a protected “public distribution”
under the federal right of first publication.219 Statutory support for this
interpretation of “public distribution” arises in the Act’s definition of
“public display.” With respect to “public display,” the Act provides: “To
perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means to perform or display it at a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social

214. Id.
215. Compare id. (using the language “first public distribution”), with Baker v. Libbie, 91 N.E.
109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (holding that a letter author has a proprietary right to publication and
commenting that publication means “making public through printing or multiplication of copies”).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
217. See id. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); id. § 106 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (“[T]he
copyright owner’s rights under section 106(3) . . . cease with respect to a particular copy or
phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it.”).
It is notable that the Act provides that publication does not occur when a person makes a public
display of the work. See id. § 106(5) (giving the owner the right to publicly display the work in
addition to the publication rights in § 106(3)). This is consistent with the common-law copyright
rule that a letter recipient does not violate the right of first publication by showing the letter to
friends or even by displaying it at a public place such as a library.
218. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (defining “publication” and the process of displaying a
work “publicly”), with Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 488 (1867) (“Publication by
the author is circulation before the public eye by printing or multiplied copies in writing.”), King v.
King, 168 P. 730, 731, 733 (Wyo. 1917) (stating an author of a work is entitled to withhold the work
from the knowledge of the public), and supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the rights of first publication).
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (stating the owner has exclusive rights “to distribute copies . . . to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”).
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acquaintances is gathered . . . .”220 This definition suggests that the word
“public” denotes “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances.”221 Accordingly, an email
recipient who forwards the email to a few acquaintances does not appear
to make a public distribution.222 Likewise, an email sender who carbon
copies a few acquaintances on an email does not appear to make a public
distribution.223 Thus, whereas the common-law right of first publication
protects an email sender’s expression from distribution to even one third
party, the federal right of first publication appears to apply only with
respect to a distribution made en masse.224
The third enumerated right—the right to display a work publicly—
extends protection beyond that provided by the common law.225 This
right provides an author the exclusive right to make a public display of
the work,226 where public display is defined to include a display “at a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered.”227 Whereas common-law copyright allows
email or letter recipients to display the email or letter in a public forum
such as a library,228 federal copyright law precludes such a display.229
2. Fair Use Under the Copyright Act
Perhaps the greatest difference between common-law copyright and
the Copyright Act is the fair-use doctrine.230 Although fair use originates
in the common law, the common law did not apply that defense where a
work was unpublished.231 The privacy protection that the common law
secured an author under the right of first publication was not subject to
220. Id. § 101.
221. See id. (containing both in § 101).
222. See id. (requiring a “substantial number”).
223. See id. (appearing to require more of a distribution by the use of the word “substantial”).
224. See sources cited supra note 218 (defining publication in both the federal right of first
publication and the common-law right of first publication).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 101.
228. See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting that at least one federal circuit has held that recipients may
“publicly” display a letter).
229. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(5) (granting the owner the exclusive right to public display).
230. See id. § 107 (making certain types of use noninfringing).
231. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549–52 (1985) (“[F]air use
in the Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law doctrine. . . . [F]air
use [under the common law] traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges of copying
from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”).

SNOW FINAL.DOC

544

7/15/2007 3:48:30 PM

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

fair use.232 Rather, common-law copyright established a nearly absolute
bar against publication.233 By contrast, the fair-use provision of the
Copyright Act allows courts to determine that otherwise infringing uses
of an author’s unpublished work are permissible.234 The Act provides a
list of nonexhaustive criteria to assist courts in determining whether a use
is permissibly fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.235

These criteria suggest that the fair-use defense would apply to casual
email correspondence. With respect to the first factor, an email recipient
often does not have a commercial purpose for forwarding casual email
correspondence to a third party.236 Often the purpose is noncommercial
in that the recipient forwards the information to inform the third party
about the sender’s idea or expression, without profiting from distributing
the material.237 The recipient may also forward the email with a
comment or criticism about the original sender’s expression. The statute
expressly cites comment and criticism as examples of purposes that
would be presumptively fair.238 Furthermore, the character of the use
appears innocuous because email forwarding has become
commonplace.239 The common practice of email forwarding suggests
232. Id.
233. See supra Part II.A.2 (noting that common-law copyright protects the author’s interests of
whether and when to publish the work).
234. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
235. Id.
236. See id. § 107(1). The Supreme Court has explained that the test for whether the use is of a
commercial nature turns on “whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
237. An all too common email-forwarding phenomenon occurs where summer associates at legal
and business firms express honest and harmful sentiments about their temporary employer. See
McGrath, supra note 6, at 34. Recipients forward the sentiments to several persons, ostensibly not
for a commercial purpose, and the email eventually becomes public knowledge. See id. For
instance, one Harvard Law student inadvertently sent an email to law-firm employees which
conveyed an attitude of indolence towards the work. Id. The email quickly became common
knowledge, eventually appearing in The New Yorker magazine. Id. Other expressions forwarded
without a commercial purpose, which eventually became public knowledge, include a summer
associate’s email about cocaine use occurring at a law firm and a new business associate’s email
about his sexual exploits on a business trip. Id.
238. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
239. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (describing the reasons that email forwarding has become
a common occurrence).
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that an email sender should expect that this outcome may result.240 The
first criterion favors fair use.
The second and third fair-use criteria disfavor the fair-use defense.241
Regardless of the content or economic value of the work, the second
criterion—the nature of the copyrighted work—always weighs against
permitting the use where the work is unpublished.242 With regard to the
third fair-use criterion—the amount and substantiality of the portion
used—the typical email that is forwarded includes the entire email that
the sender expressed to the original recipient.
The fourth criterion—the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work243—is, according to the Supreme
Court, the most important of the four listed fair-use criteria.244 Applying
this criterion to the email context reveals that it favors the fair-use
defense. Although the email may be personally valuable to the sender,
this fourth criterion examines economic value as determined in the public
marketplace for expression.245
Where email expresses casual
correspondence, there is usually no market for the expression.246 Market

240. See Mandel, supra note 6 (advising that email senders should expect this outcome).
241. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)–(3) (considering the nature of the copyrighted work and the amount
copied).
242. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (discussing
second fair-use criterion and commenting that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works”); Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding
that fair use applied but noting that “[o]nly the second factor, the unpublished nature of plaintiff’s
letters, favors plaintiff”).
243. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
244. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (“The fourth factor is the ‘most important,
and indeed, central fair use factor.’” (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (1989))); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (describing the fourth criterion as
“the single most important element of fair use”); accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (analyzing fourth criterion and observing that the very
“purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort”).
245. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 598 (contrasting the informational value of a work’s use
under the second criterion with the economic harm of the use under the fourth criterion).
246. See Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320, 324 (N.Y. Ch. 1848) (“It is evident . . . the
complainant never could have considered [the letters] as of any value whatever as literary
productions. For a letter cannot be considered of value to the author, for the purpose of publication,
which he never would consent to have published . . . .”); accord Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch.
515, 528 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) (“[T]he court of chancery has [not] exercised the power of preventing a
publication of private letters of business on the ground of copy-right or literary property, when they
possess none of the attributes of literary compositions . . . .”). But see Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65
Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 506–07 (1867) (Williams, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Hoyt and Wetmore are
no longer controlling authority); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855)
(rejecting court decisions holding that private letters should not receive proprietary protection).
The view that there is no market for casual email correspondence does not hold true where the
email sender is a public figure. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)
(valuing author’s private letters at $500,000).
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value of personal correspondence is usually nonextant.247 The lack of a
potential market for personal email suggests an absence of economic
harm, thereby implying that a recipient’s forwarding use would be a fair
use.248
Thus, where email is a casual correspondence with no economic
value, a strong argument favors the defense of fair use. The following
facts support its application: (1) the purpose of email forwarding is not
commercial in nature; (2) the character of email forwarding appears
innocuous given its common practice; and (3) there is no harmful
economic impact resulting from email forwarding. Two of the four fairuse criteria, one of which is the most weighty of the four, suggest its
application. Fair use likely excuses a recipient’s forwarding of an email
containing casual correspondence.249 It thus appears that the Copyright
Act falls short of protecting an email sender’s interest in keeping email
expression private, which the common law did so well for letter authors.
B. Caselaw and Legislative History of the Copyright Act
The above statutory analysis suggests that the Copyright Act’s fairuse provision likely strips an email recipient of any privacy protection.250
Caselaw and legislative history dealing with unpublished works suggest
that this conclusion is correct.251 Initially, however, courts considering
the Act’s fair-use defense were reluctant to weaken the privacy
protection that the common law had in the past afforded authors of
unpublished works.252 As this judicial reluctance became evident,
Congress amended the Copyright Act so that it explicitly subjected

247. See generally sources cited supra note 246 (noting distinctions between private letters and
literary compositions).
248. See Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (determining that
fourth fair-use criterion justified defendant’s use of plaintiff’s private letters on basis that “plaintiff
ha[d] provided no evidence of a valuable market”).
249. In the situation where an email contains expression that is economically valuable, fair use
would not likely apply. For example, an unpublished manuscript of a soon-to-be best-selling novel
that is printed in, or attached to, an email would merit as much copyright protection under the Act as
if the unpublished manuscript had not been in an email form. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
561, 566–69 (refusing to apply fair use to soon-to-be-published manuscript). The first and fourth
factors, which had favored fair-use application in casual correspondence, would in this situation
disfavor fair use. Id. The economic value of such an email would be sufficient to preclude a fair-use
defense.
250. See supra Part III.A.2.
251. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing judicial response to the 1992 amendment of the Copyright
Act that explicitly applied fair use to unpublished materials).
252. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
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unpublished works to the fair-use defense.253 Courts responded to that
amendment by giving less weight to the fact that a work was unpublished
when analyzing whether a use was fair.254 Accordingly, courts now
apply the Act so that an author’s interest in keeping a work private does
not provide a compelling reason to keep another party from publishing
the work.255 In general, publication must cause economic harm to the
author before the Act protects the expression.256 The Act trades
common-law privacy for public utility. The subparts below describe this
caselaw and legislative history.
1. Supreme Court Commentary in Harper & Row
Following the enactment of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
considered whether the fair-use defense applied where a defendant,
without authorization, published memoirs that the plaintiffs were
preparing for publication.257 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, the defendant, a magazine entitled The Nation,
received a copy of former President Ford’s soon-to-be-published
memoirs, which contained significant details about his pardon of former
President Nixon.258 The Nation received that copy in secret, without
obtaining authorization to possess, much less publish, its contents.259 Mr.
Ford had agreed to publish his memoirs with the plaintiffs, who had
licensed Time magazine to publish excerpts prior to the plaintiffs’ full
publication of the memoirs.260 A few weeks before Time published the
excerpts, The Nation published selections of the memoirs.261
In considering the plaintiffs’ claim of copyright infringement, the
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between the Copyright Act
and common-law copyright.262 The Court recognized the absolute nature
of an author’s right of first publication under the common law.263 The
Court opined that “fair use traditionally was not recognized as a defense
253. See infra Part III.B.3.
254. See infra Part III.B.3.
255. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing judicial rules regarding fair use that disregarded the
question of the author’s privacy interest altogether).
256. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of “market effect” as the most important
criterion in applying fair use).
257. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542–43 (1985).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 543.
260. Id. at 542–43.
261. Id. at 543.
262. Id. at 549–52.
263. Id. at 550–51.
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to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”264
Fair use was not applied to unpublished works because, according to the
Court, that defense “was predicated on the author’s implied consent to
‘reasonable and customary’ use when he released his work for public
consumption.”265 In the Court’s words: “Under common-law copyright,
‘the property of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute
until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same.’”266 The Court further
observed that an author voluntarily parts with the common-law property
right of expression only when the author publishes the work, either
through formal publication or “de facto” publication.267
After acknowledging the common-law privacy protection of
unpublished works, the Court explained that the Copyright Act adopts
that protection.268 That adoption, the Court declared, is apparent from
the fact that the Act recognizes a right of first publication.269 The Court
further recognized that the Act’s fair-use provision does not “change,
narrow, or enlarge” the scope of that defense as it had been applied (or
rather not applied) to unpublished works under the common law.270 The
Court summed up its analysis with the following rule: “Under ordinary
circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public appearance of
his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”271
Despite this seeming brightline rule that the Court set forth with
regards to unpublished works, the Court could not entirely ignore the
Act’s fair-use provision in view of the fact that the statute appeared to
allow application of fair use as to all copyright rights, including the right
of first publication.272 The Court therefore proceeded to address the four

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 551 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000))) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 552.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 554 (referencing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680).
271. Id. at 555. The cited statement contrasts with a statement that the Court later made in the
same Harper & Row opinion: the Court later stated that the fourth fair-use criterion—the market
effect—was the “single most important element” in the fair-use analysis. Id. at 566. The seeming
tension between these statements is enigmatic. It is possible that the Court viewed the fourth
criterion as the single most important element where an author had already published, or was
planning to publish, the work.
272. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (“fair use of a copyrighted work”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
560–69 (analyzing The Nation’s fair-use argument).
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specific fair-use criteria, noting “that the scope of fair use is narrower
with respect to unpublished works.”273
All four fair-use criteria disfavored fair use.274 Because The Nation
had profited from publishing Mr. Ford’s memoirs, and because the
rightful copyright holder intended to publish those memoirs, the Court
held that The Nation had distributed the memoirs for a commercial
purpose and had caused economic harm to the copyright holder.275
Likewise, the unpublished nature of the work and the amount and
substantiality of the memoirs that The Nation used also suggested that
the use was not fair.276 In determining that all four criteria disfavored
fair use, the Court appeared to attach greatest weight to the second
criterion—the nature of the work—as that criterion addressed the fact
that the memoirs were unpublished.277
The language of Harper & Row thus indicates that the Court was
attempting to uphold the privacy protection that the common law had
afforded unpublished works.278 While expressly acknowledging that
common-law copyright exists to protect privacy, the Harper & Row
Court treated the Act as a codification of the existing right of first
publication under the common law.279 Although the Court recognized
that the Act allows for a fair-use defense, the Court was careful to point
out that the Act does not “change, narrow, or enlarge” the fair-use
doctrine with respect to unpublished works.280 Harper & Row appears to
be an attempt to uphold common-law privacy protection under the
Copyright Act.281
2. Judicial Response to Harper & Row
After Harper & Row, federal courts of appeals began following the
Supreme Court’s direction by refusing to apply the fair-use defense to
273. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 560–69.
275. Id. at 561–63, 566–69.
276. Id. at 564–66.
277. Id. at 564.
278. See id. at 550–51, 554 (“[F]air use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges
of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works. . . . It is true that common-law copyright
was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy. . . . [The effect of the Copyright Act is to]
preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works . . . and not to ‘change, narrow, or
enlarge it.’”).
279. Id. at 554 (referencing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680).
280. Id.
281. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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unpublished works.282 In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., the Second
Circuit held that author J.D. Salinger could prohibit defendant Random
House, Inc. from publishing a biography about Salinger which contained
excerpts of Salinger’s personal letters to various friends.283 After
viewing a draft of the biography, Salinger sought protection under the
Copyright Act for the purpose of keeping the letters private.284 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that unlike the common law, the Act
subjects an author’s right of first publication to fair use.285 Yet,
according to the court, the scope of the fair-use defense as applied to
unpublished works was rather limited in view of Harper & Row.286 The
court read Harper & Row to mean that “unpublished letters normally
enjoy insulation from fair use copying.”287
After opining on the strong protection afforded unpublished works,
the Salinger court appeared to treat the fair-use test as a mere
afterthought. Although the purpose of the defendants’ use of the
letters—criticism, scholarship, and research—suggested that the use was
fair, this fact was not sufficient to overcome the unpublished nature of
the letters.288 As for the fourth fair-use criterion—the effect of the use on
the potential market—the Salinger court faced the situation where the
author disavowed any intent to publish his private letters.289 Undeterred
by Salinger’s intent not to publish, the court proceeded to rely on the
value of the letters that Salinger’s agent had estimated, which
undoubtedly was based on the fact that the letters were unpublished.290
The fact that Salinger was a famous person, coupled with the fact that
there existed a single copy of each letter, boosted the letters’ value to

282. But see Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying fair
use to publication of biography containing excerpts of decedent’s private letters). The Wright court
applied fair use arguably because courts appear less likely to protect an author’s privacy interest
where the author is deceased. See Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair
Use from the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369, 392 (2001) (opining that the issue of
whether an author is alive at the time of the use is a criterion for applying fair use).
283. 811 F.2d 90, 92–93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1987).
284. Id. at 93–94.
285. Id. at 95.
286. Id. at 95, 97.
287. Id. at 95.
288. Id. at 96–97.
289. Id. at 99.
290. Id.; see also Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the
Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1999) (analyzing the alleged $500,000 value on
which the Salinger court relied). The strong protection that Harper & Row and Salinger offered
authors of unpublished works led to widespread revision and in some instances cancellation of
numerous works that utilized unpublished resources. Id. at 21.
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$500,000.291 Because the value was so great, the fact that even a few
potential consumers might be deterred from purchasing the expression
was sufficient to find a harmful effect on the market, thereby favoring
protection of Salinger’s copyright.292 The court construed the fourth fairuse criterion as favoring the copyright holder directly due to the fact that
the work under consideration was unpublished.293
Two years after Salinger, the Second Circuit again heard a case
involving a biographer’s use of private letters in a biography.294 In New
Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., the Second
Circuit cursorily reiterated its position that the unpublished nature of a
work weighs heavily in favor of upholding a copyright.295 New Era
confirmed that absent extraordinary circumstances, an infringing use
simply could not be fair if the work were unpublished.296
3. The 1992 Amendment to the Copyright Act
In response to the judicial trend of providing unpublished works
near-absolute protection under the Copyright Act, Congress, in 1992,
passed an amendment to the Copyright Act (“1992 Amendment”).297
The fair-use provision of the Act was amended to include the following
sentence: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
[enumerated fair-use] factors.”298 The 1992 Amendment appears to
constitute a congressional rejection of the idea that if a work were
unpublished, an author would receive automatic protection absent
extraordinarily compelling circumstances.299 Expressly rejecting the
strong protection Salinger provided unpublished works, the House
Report to the 1992 Amendment notes the legislature’s concern over the
291. Crews, supra note 290, at 20.
292. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
293. Id.; Crews, supra note 290, at 20.
294. New Era Publ’ns Int’l ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
295. Id. at 583.
296. Id. Owing to a laches defense, the court did not grant the plaintiff relief. Id. at 584–85.
Another court following Harper & Row opined that the unpublished nature of letters merits full
copyright protection, and that fair use “generally applies to materials already released by an author
for public consumption.” Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Ariz. 1985).
297. Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)).
298. Id.
299. The legislative history indicates that Congress disapproved of the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of Harper & Row as establishing a per se rule protecting unpublished works from fair
use. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 4–9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555–61.
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Second Circuit’s statement that unpublished works “‘normally enjoy
complete protection against copying any protected expression.’”300
This reaction from the legislature was predictable. Popular culture
values expression regardless of, and perhaps because of, its private
nature.301 Public access to private works benefits the masses at the cost
of one individual’s privacy. Representing the populace, Congress had an
opportunity to maximize public benefit at a minimal cost. That a
multitude gained utility where only one individual lost privacy was
sufficient reason for Congress to undermine the centuries-old doctrine of
the common-law right of first publication.
Subsequent to the 1992 Amendment, courts began rejecting the
principle that unpublished works deserved near-absolute copyright
protection.302 In Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc.,303 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether fair use protected a defendant’s dissemination of an
author’s unpublished manuscript.304 After quoting the Supreme Court’s
language in Harper & Row, which stated that undisseminated expression
outweighs a claim of fair use, the court opined that this Supreme Court
mandate was overturned when Congress passed the 1992 Amendment.305
Controlling the court’s fair-use analysis was the fact that the copies were
disseminated to only a few parties.306 The dissemination did not detract
from the commercial viability of the unpublished manuscript, but rather
may have promoted commercial interest in the manuscript.307
Commercial value dictated application of fair use.308 Privacy was never
mentioned, much less considered.309

300. Id. at 8 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987)).
301. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (explaining public popularity of email
correspondence intended to be private).
302. Also telling about the effect of the 1992 Amendment are those cases decided just after the
Amendment’s enactment, yet based on facts that occurred prior to its enactment. As the Amendment
was not retroactive, those courts held that fair use did not apply to the unpublished works at issue.
See CSM Investors, Inc. v. Everest Dev., Ltd., 840 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. Minn. 1994) (relying on
Harper & Row’s statement that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works”
to find that fair use did not apply to unpublished architectural designs); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine
Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 n.10, 1104–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying fair use for publication of
private letters despite fact that the effect on the market favored fair use, but purporting that the
Amendment’s application would have made no difference in its decision).
303. 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).
304. Id. at 201.
305. Id. at 204–05.
306. Id. at 206–07.
307. Id. at 207.
308. Id. at 207–08.
309. See id. at 202 (failing to set forth privacy as a factor used to guide a court when deciding
whether the fair-use doctrine applies).
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In Norse v. Henry Holt & Co.,310 another federal court relied on the
Amendment to apply fair use to unpublished works.311 On remand from
the Ninth Circuit, a California district court considered whether to apply
fair use where an author’s embarrassing statements in his private letters
appeared in a published book.312
Twice referring to the 1992
Amendment, the court determined that the fair-use criteria overall
favored labeling the defendant’s publication as fair.313 As for the
purpose of the use, the book containing the private letters was a scholarly
biography—albeit with commercial potential—and scholarship
suggested a permissible use.314 As for market effect, the court treated
this factor as “the single most important element of fair use.”315 The
publisher’s use of the letters, the court declared, would not have
adversely affected the publication value to the author.316 Moreover, in
conjunction with this “most important” fair-use criterion, the court noted
the absence of any market for the letters.317 Fair use thereby deprived the
author of his privacy.
Consistent with the above caselaw, the 1992 Amendment appears to
preclude federal copyright protection for most email expression. The
Amendment subjects unpublished works to the full force of fair use, and
accordingly has led courts to ignore an author’s privacy interest under
prior copyright jurisprudence.318 Where an email expression has no
commercial value, the 1992 Amendment expressly places the expression
outside the protection of federal copyright law. Simply put, the
Copyright Act fails to protect email privacy.
C. Two Competing Interests Under One Copyright Theory
The above discussion regarding caselaw interpretation of the 1992
Amendment portrays a conundrum that email presents under the
Copyright Act. On the one hand, the Act purports to protect privacy

310. 847 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
311. Id. at 146–47.
312. Id. at 144.
313. Id. at 146–47.
314. Id. at 145.
315. Id. at 147 (internal quotations omitted).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
defendant’s use of an unpublished manuscript was permissible under the fair-use exception); Norse,
847 F. Supp. at 142 (holding that defendant biographer was protected by fair-use defense after
publishing author’s private letters).
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interests by providing a right of first publication.319 Historically that
right has existed for the purpose of allowing authors the opportunity to
keep their works private.320 Email falls within this category of
copyright.321 On the other hand, the Act represents an attempt to provide
an optimal level of creative works for public consumption.322 The Act
engenders creative works by providing commercial incentive to produce
them in the form of a production monopoly.323 The Act further allows
for unrestricted public access to creative works where the monopolistic
commercial incentive is unnecessary.324 Fair use provides this access,325
and it is squarely at odds with an author’s privacy interest.326 A
contradiction thus arises between the purposes of the Act.327 Privacy
protection under the right of first publication competes with public
access under the fair-use doctrine.328
The tension between privacy protection and public access stems from
a fundamental difference in philosophies of property. At the root of an
author’s right of first publication is the Lockean principle that labor
results in absolute property.329 According to John Locke, a laborer holds
319. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
320. Goldstein, supra note 70, at 1004; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–200, 204–05.
321. See supra Part II.A (discussing common-law privacy rights of email senders).
322. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (characterizing the goal of the Copyright Act as the
stimulation of authorship for public edification).
323. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 n.4 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
324. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–20 (opining that fair use should apply to works that
copyright was not designed to stimulate).
325. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
326. See Crews, supra note 290, at 35–36 (“Legitimate privacy concerns should be analyzed
directly and not be entangled with copyright law. Privacy is a serious right to be respected, but
privacy law and copyright have conflicting objectives.” (footnote omitted)).
327. See id. at 36 (“Privacy secures confidential actions, thoughts, and writings; copyright, by
contrast, seeks to promote the growth of knowledge through public dissemination of information.”
(citing Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1983))).
328. See Note, Personal Letters: In Need of a Law of Their Own, 44 IOWA L. REV. 705, 715
(1959) [hereinafter Personal Letters] (arguing that copyright law does not adequately provide the
proprietary protection necessary to secure privacy of personal correspondence on the basis that “the
injury sustained by the unauthorized publication or dissemination of private letters is usually quite
different from that arising from the piracy of an author’s literary work”).
329. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“It is generally recognized that one
has a right to the fruits of his labor . . . . The labor of composing letters for private and familiar
correspondence may be trifling, or it may be severe, but it is none the less the result of an
expenditure of thought and time.”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690) (opining that property rights vest when a
person exerts labor over a thing in a way that excludes the common right that others hold in the
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absolute property rights in the product of his or her labor.330 The
absolute rights of property allow the laborer to control the uses of the
product of his labor against all others.331 In the email context, because
the email expression results from the labor of the sender, according to
Locke that expression would be a product over which the sender holds
absolute property rights.332 Locke’s view suggests that an email sender
has a right to control the product that results from the sender’s effort to
communicate an idea.333 Maintaining privacy in an email expression is,
under Lockean philosophy, a manifestation of the property-based control
an email sender may exercise.
In contrast to the Lockean philosophy that is manifest in an author’s
right of first publication, the fair-use doctrine represents a completely
different property philosophy. Fair use is a manifestation of a utilitarian
view of property.334 Under the utilitarian philosophy, property rights
exist to increase society’s net welfare.335 Awarding an author a property
right to mass produce an expression encourages authors to create works
for public consumption, ultimately increasing social welfare.336
Conversely, where works exist without a need for production incentives,
the utilitarian theory posits that copyright law should not reward authors
with property rights.337 For such works, social welfare is greater without
property rights bestowed on the authors. Fair use, then, is the means
thing).
330. LOCKE, supra note 329, at 306.
331. Id.
332. See id. (“For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he
can have a right to [it] . . . .”); see also Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 485 (1867)
(basing its holding that letters merit proprietary protection on the rationale that “[a] production of the
mind is property in every essential sense in which a production of the hands is the producer’s
property”); Baker, 97 N.E. at 111 (“The basic principle on which the right of the author is sustained .
. . is not their literary quality, but the fact that they are the product of labor.”).
333. See sources cited supra note 332 (explaining that one who creates something has the right
to control it).
334. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1107–10 (arguing that the goal of copyright is utilitarian in
nature by furthering creation of works and providing exceptions, such as fair use, to promote this
goal).
335. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (commenting on the Copyright Act,
and noting that “‘the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public
benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.’” (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994))); Leval, supra note 88, at
1109 (“The copyright law embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is vital to the
well-being of society. It is a pragmatic measure by which society confers monopoly-exploitation
benefits for a limited duration on authors and artists . . . in order to obtain for itself the intellectual
and practical enrichment that results from creative endeavors.”).
336. Leval, supra note 88, at 1109.
337. See id. at 1109–10 (discussing rationale for allowing fair use in light of the incentive that
copyright provides for fostering creativity).
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whereby courts may determine whether protecting an author’s monopoly
Privacy is unimportant in that
will benefit social welfare.338
determination.339 Most important is the economic effect of the use, for
that affects the author’s incentive to produce the work.340 Tellingly,
many common-law courts noted a conclusion contrary to this economicvalue criterion of fair use: those courts concluded that the absence of
literary value should not affect legal protection of an author’s right of
first publication.341
Any privacy protection the Copyright Act purportedly offers appears
to be incidental to the Act’s utilitarian end. Application of the fair-use
defense to unpublished private works, especially since the 1992
Amendment, has become the norm. Furthermore, it is apparent that the
Act focuses on utilitarian principles at the expense of an author’s privacy
based on the Act’s registration requirement. In order to obtain relief
under the Act, an author must make the expression available for public
inspection by registering it with the Copyright Office.342
This
registration requirement means that even if fair use did not apply to a
casual email, the email sender’s attempt to enforce privacy would in fact
decrease that privacy.343 As soon as the sender would register the email
338. See id. at 1107–10 (commenting that fair use is consistent with the utilitarian focus of
copyright law).
339. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (“That a multitude gained utility where only one
individual lost privacy was sufficient reason for Congress to undermine the centuries-old doctrine of
the common-law right of first publication.”).
340. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (“Commercial value dicatated application of fair use.”).
341. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (“I hold,
that the author of any letter or letters . . . whether they are literary compositions, or familiar letters,
or letters of business, possess the sole and exclusive copyright therein . . . .”); Baker v. Libbie, 97
N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912) (“The existence of a right in the author over his letters, even though
private and without worth as literature, is established on principle and authority.”); Woolsey v. Judd,
11 How. Pr. 49, 63, 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (commenting that “[e]very writing, in which words are
so arranged as to convey the thoughts of the writer to the mind of a reader, is a literary composition”
to support its holding that copyright applies to “private letters, although not intended to be published,
and however familiar and trivial the subjects to which they relate”); Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng.
Rep. 670, 675–76 (Ch.) (“It has been decided, fortunately for the welfare of society, that the writer
of letters, though written without any purpose of profit, or any idea of literary property, possesses
such a right of property in them, that they cannot be published without his consent, unless the
purposes of justice, civil or criminal, require the publication.”); accord Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart.
(o.s.) 297, 302 (Orleans 1811) (noting that “the right of publishing a letter remains exclusively in the
writer” notwithstanding that the letter was “not written with a view to profit”).
342. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 705(a)–(b) (2000) (“The Register of Copyrights shall ensure that records
of . . . registrations . . . shall be open to public inspection.”); Tedder Boat Ramp Sys. v. Hillsborough
County, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[C]opyrights are available to the public for
examination and viewing purposes.”).
343. See Crews, supra note 290, at 17 n.74 (commenting on the irony that arises when a
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expression to bring suit, the expression would be available for public
viewing.344 The reason for this registration requirement appears to be
that it facilitates public utility as an exchange for the author’s copyright
monopoly.345 Simply stated, it furthers public benefit. Wholly utilitarian
in nature, the registration requirement is completely at odds with
protecting privacy interests.346
The Copyright Act thus appears to acknowledge the dual purposes of
copyright protection without providing separate legal theories for each
purpose. The two purposes compete: one purports to keep expression
private; the other seeks to engender public consumption of expression.347
The Act creates an appearance of serving the former purpose through its
right of first publication,348 but in reality the Act serves only the latter, as
evidenced by its fair-use provision.349 The coexistence of these two
competing interests under the same legal theory is dubious.350 Although
this tension has arisen prior to the advent of email, its presence is more
frequent and pronounced in the email context than in the occasional
circumstance involving letters cited in a biography. As email forwarding
abounds, the Act sacrifices email privacy for public access to expression.
D. Resolution of the Privacy Conundrum
The apparent conflict in the Copyright Act which seems to leave
email expression without privacy protection may be resolvable. A strong
argument supports the view that the Act does not preempt the commonlaw right of first publication.351 The starting point for this argument
begins with the starting point for the Copyright Act: the Constitution.352
copyright holder interested in protecting privacy seeks to enforce protection by registering the
private work); Leval, supra note 88, at 1130 (same).
344. See sources cited supra note 343.
345. An author need not register the work prior to the infringing act to invoke federal copyright
protection. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (Historical and Statutory Notes). Registration must merely occur prior
to bringing suit. Id.
346. See sources cited supra note 343.
347. See Crews, supra note 290, at 36 (stating privacy and “growth of knowledge through public
dissemination” are conflicting objectives).
348. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000) (giving copyright owners exclusive right to distribute
copyrighted works).
349. See id. § 107 (allowing noncopyright owners to copy and distribute copyrighted works in
certain circumstances).
350. See Crews, supra note 290, at 35–36 (arguing that privacy interests should not be protected
under copyright law).
351. See infra Part III.D.1–2 (discussing congressional power to enact copyright laws under the
Constitution and the common law).
352. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the powers and limitations of congressional copyright
authority under the Constitution).
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1. A Constitutional Challenge to the Scope of the Copyright Act
Congressional power to enact the Copyright Act stems from the
Copyright and Patent Clause in the Constitution.353 The Clause states
that Congress has power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”354 The
Clause is unmistakably utilitarian in nature.355 It grants Congress power
to legislate property rights that promote the progress of science and
useful arts.356 The words “progress” and “useful” suggest that the
property rights granted by Congress must provide society some sort of
utility.357 Federal property rights encompass rights that progress societal
understanding of science or that provide societal utility through arts.358
A work falls within the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause
inasmuch as it progresses science or promotes usefulness, regardless of
how minute the progress or use may be, how subjectively the progress or
use may be measured, or how few members of society benefit from the
progress or use.359
This apparent utilitarian purpose underlying the Copyright and
Patent Clause implies that a right which fails to progress science or
promote usefulness does not fall within the scope of that Clause.360
Congress may legislate only those rights that promote the progress of
science or the useful arts.361 Any right that does otherwise is a right that
353. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (describing the congressional authority to
enact the Copyright Act under the Copyright and Patent Clause, and commenting that the Clause acts
as “both a grant of power and a limitation”).
354. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
355. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (describing the
purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause as furthering public illumination).
356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
357. See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1989) (defining “progress” to mean “gradual betterment; especially: the progressive development of
humankind,” and “useful” to mean “capable of being put to use; especially: serviceable for an end or
purpose”).
358. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
359. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”).
360. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (“Placing all unpublished private papers under lock and
key, immune from any fair use, for periods of fifty to one hundred years, conflicts with the purposes
of the copyright clause. Such a rule would use copyright to further secrecy and concealment instead
of public illumination.”).
361. During a congressional hearing on whether fair use could apply to unpublished works,
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Congress may not legislate under the Clause. The Constitution therefore
appears to prevent Congress from creating rights that do not serve the
utilitarian end of the Copyright and Patent Clause.362
This interpretation of the Copyright and Patent Clause is consistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. Several Supreme Court Cases clearly
portray the utilitarian focus of the Clause.363 On two occasions the Court
has described the “philosophy behind” the Clause as “the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors.”364 Similarly, the
Court has recognized that “the incentive to profit from the exploitation of
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the
proliferation of knowledge.”365 In no uncertain terms, the Court has
recognized the end of the Copyright and Patent Clause as providing
social benefit.366 Indeed, serving the public good and advancing public

Judge Pierre Leval of the federal district court for the Southern District of New York testified as
follows: “Protecting the right of privacy [through copyright] does not promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. To the contrary, it serves secrecy. The Constitution does not grant to
Congress a power to pass tort laws for the protection of privacy.” Fair Use and Unpublished Works:
Joint Hearing on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop.,
and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 107 (1990); see also
Crews, supra note 290, at 36 (agreeing with the previously cited statement of Judge Leval).
362. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (interpreting the Copyright and Patent Clause as “both a grant
of power and a limitation”). Congress’s powers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by Congress must be
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”).
363. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (“[E]ncouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating the goal of copyright law is to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966) (stating that Thomas
Jefferson recognized the “social and economic rationale of the patent system”); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (same as Eldred).
364. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (emphasis added); Mazer, 374 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added).
365. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
366. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (“[A]s James Madison observed, in copyright the public
good fully coincides with the claims of individuals. . . . [C]opyright law serves public ends by
providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.” (internal quotations omitted)); Feist,
499 U.S. at 349 (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). The Court has cited the writing of Thomas
Jefferson for insight into the Copyright and Patent Clause as it applies to patents:
[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly
[and thereby the copyright monopoly] was not designed to secure to the inventor [and
author] his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to
bring forth new knowledge.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 8–9.
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welfare is a utilitarian philosophy.367 Supreme Court jurisprudence
indicates that the Copyright and Patent Clause serves a utilitarian end.368
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the Clause’s utilitarian
end limits Congress’s power.369 In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City, the Court commented that the purpose of the Clause places a
restriction on congressional power to create property rights.370 The Court
stated: “The Congress in the exercise of the patent power [and thereby
the copyright power] may not overreach the restraints imposed by the
stated constitutional purpose.”371 Although the Court considered the
Clause’s application to the patent system, Congress’s patent power arises
from the same Clause: the Court’s comments regarding that Clause
should apply in the copyright context as well. The purpose of the
Copyright and Patent Clause—utilitarian public benefit—limits the rights
that Congress can legislate.
This constitutional limitation severely restricts the federal right of
first publication under the Copyright Act. Specifically, the right of first
publication under the Act is valid only to the extent that it serves a
utilitarian end. A utilitarian end exists only if there is a possibility that
the author will publicly disseminate the work.372 Absent the possibility
of publication, there is no utilitarian end for the Act’s right of first
publication to further.373 So from the time that the author contemplates
publication through the time of actual publication, the Act’s right of first
publication protects the author’s interest in realizing commercial gain
from the work.374 But prior to an author ever contemplating the
possibility of publication, the Act’s right of first publication furthers no
utilitarian end.375 In that situation, the federal right remains dormant.
That is, where an author seeks to hold the work private, the right does not
367. See discussion supra Part III.C (analyzing the tension between authors’ rights to protection
and the pubic benefit gained through access to information).
368. See cases cited supra note 363.
369. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6.
370. Id.; accord Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (quoting Graham as describing the Copyright and
Patent Clause as “both a grant of power and a limitation”).
371. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6.
372. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1119 (contrasting copyright coverage for works intended and
not intended for publication in light of the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause).
373. See id. at 1109–10 (explaining how an author’s exploitation of a monopoly benefits the
public good).
374. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985)
(discussing dichotomy between right of first publication’s commercial-interest protection and right
of first publication’s privacy-interest protection); Leval, supra note 88, at 1120–21 (analyzing the
state at which authors should receive copyright protection for yet-to-be-published works).
375. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 (stating that the rationale for protecting works that the
author had no intention to publish has focused on personal privacy).
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serve a utilitarian end.376 The author’s interest in holding the work
private implies the absence of a commercial interest, and therefore, the
absence of a utilitarian purpose.377 Thus, the purpose of the Copyright
and Patent Clause—to further public utility—restricts the scope of the
federal right of first publication. An author may invoke that right only
when the author contemplates publishing a work.378
2. The Survival of Common-Law Copyright
The constitutional restriction on the federal right of first publication
implies that the Copyright Act should not preempt the common-law
copyright protection of an author’s privacy interest. The Act provides
that it preempts common-law rights “that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106.”379 The right of first publication specified in § 106 of the
Act is not “equivalent” to the common-law right of first publication.380
The former serves utilitarian interests; the latter serves privacy interests.
As stated above, the Constitution limits the property rights that Congress
may create to those which serve a utilitarian purpose. Accordingly, the
Act’s right of first publication should not be construed as preempting a
right that serves a contrary interest.

376. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (“The second [fair-use] factor should not turn solely,
nor even primarily, on the published/unpublished dichotomy. At issue is the advancement of the
utilitarian goal of copyright—to stimulate authorship for the public edification.”).
377. See id. at 1116–19 (discussing historical treatment of writings not intended for publication).
378. The fact that the federal right of first publication under the Copyright Act is not violated by
distributing a work to a few acquaintances is consistent with the utilitarian theory underlying federal
copyright law. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (discussing exclusive rights in the context of
email). Consider the following example: A book editor makes a copy of a yet-to-be-published novel
with the permission of the author, but then gives that copy to a friend without the author’s
permission. Infringement would lie under the common-law right of first publication, see discussion
supra Part III.A.2 (noting that common-law copyright provides a nearly absolute bar against
publication). It would not lie, however, under federal law. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (noting
that distribution of a single copy of the work does not appear to constitute a publication under
federal copyright law). The number of persons to whom the editor distributed the copies was too
minimal to constitute a public distribution sufficient to invoke the federal right. This is so because
copies distributed to a de minimis number of third parties would not negatively affect the aggregate
market for an author’s work. See On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The de
minimis doctrine essentially provides that where unauthorized copying is sufficiently trivial, ‘the law
will not impose legal consequences.’”). The author’s incentive to distribute the work to the public is
preserved, so the utilitarian purpose of copyright does not warrant an infringement.
379. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
380. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing utilitarian policy of the Copyright Clause and its
application to the Copyright Act).
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If an author intends to withhold a work from ever being published,
the Act’s right of first publication would not apply in that situation.381
The right effectively remains dormant.382 The author has no commercial
interest, so there is no possibility of public access, further implying that
there is no invocation of the federal right of first publication.383 Under
the common law, however, the right of first publication would apply.384
Where the author does not even contemplate publishing a work, the
common law offers a right that protects expressive privacy.385 Whereas
the federal right of first publication lies dormant in the absence of an
intent to publicly disseminate, the common-law right of first publication
is at that point in full force.386 The federal right protects an author from
being scooped; the common-law right protects an author from being
found out. The rights should not be construed as being “equivalent.”
There should be no preemption.387
Another reason that the Act should not be viewed as preempting the
common law right of first publication is that it leads to an absurd
outcome. Preemption of a right facilitating the privacy of a work
effectively represents a means to strip away that right through the fairuse defense.388 Because casual correspondence held private is by
definition a work that has no potential economic value or market, it will
never receive federal copyright protection.389 The federal right of first
publication, then, does not represent a “right” as to private works. It
represents a deprivation of a right. If preempted, a common-law right
that secures private expression would always be subject to the federal
fair-use defense.390 For authors of private works, the federal “right”
would effectively represent the federal defense.391 Preemption would not
effect a right replacement, but rather a right deprivation.

381. See supra Part III.D.1 (arguing that the apparent utilitarian purpose of the Copyright and
Patent Clause implies that a right that does not progress science or the useful arts does not fall within
the scope of the Clause).
382. See supra Part III.D.1.
383. See supra Part III.D.1 (arguing that the Constitution may prevent Congress from creating
rights that do not serve the Copyright and Patent Clause’s utilitarian ends).
384. See supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1 (discussing common law protection of privacy).
385. See supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1.
386. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985)
(comparing commercial-interest protection of the Copyright Act with privacy-interest protection of
common-law copyright); supra Parts II.A.1, III.D.1.
387. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (providing that “equivalent” rights are preempted).
388. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication).
389. See supra Part II.A.2.
390. See supra Part II.A.2.
391. See supra Part II.A.2.
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The view that the Copyright Act should not preempt the commonlaw right of first publication is supported by portions of the Act’s
legislative history. The legislative history states: “[C]ommon law rights
of ‘privacy’ . . . would remain unaffected [by the Copyright Act] as long
as the causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal
rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind
from copyright infringement.”392 This statement is relevant in light of
the privacy argument set forth by Warren and Brandeis in their article,
The Right to Privacy, discussed above.393 They argued that the commonlaw right of first publication represents a common-law right of
privacy.394 That this right has a copyright label does not detract from its
function of protecting an author’s interest in keeping expression private,
they contended.395 The right of first publication is, according to Warren
and Brandeis, a right of privacy.396 The congressional history of the Act,
which recognizes that the Act does not extend to “rights of ‘privacy,’”397
contravenes preemption of the common-law right of first publication.
Interpreting the federal right of first publication under the Copyright
Act as applying only to works intended to be published is consistent with
the 1992 Amendment.398 The fact that the Amendment subjects
unpublished works to the fair-use defense is consistent with the view that
the federal right of first publication protects an author’s commercial
interest only in an unpublished work that is yet to be published. To the
extent that a work will be published, a fair-use analysis is appropriate to
evaluate the utilitarian value of protecting the yet-to-be-published
work.399 That the work is not yet published may be a fact to consider in
the fair-use analysis, but it should not be controlling.400 Given that the
work will eventually be published, the second criterion—the nature of
the work—appears secondary to the fourth criterion—the effect of the

392. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748. But see
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (concluding that the
effect of the Act is “to preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works”).
393. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, at 198–205.
394. Id. at 198–99, 204–05.
395. Id. at 204–05.
396. Id. at 205.
397. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 176 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5748.
398. Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000)).
399. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985)
(analyzing fair-use defense as applied to a soon-to-be-published unpublished work).
400. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1118–19 (arguing that the fact that a work is unpublished
should not affect the second fair-use criterion—the nature of the copyrighted work—as the
Copyright Act concerns works intended for publication).
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use on the potential market.401 By lessening the weight that courts
should attach to the unpublished nature of a work, the 1992 Amendment
is consistent with interpreting the Act so that it does not preempt
common-law protection of privacy.
It should be noted that the Copyright Act does preempt a portion of
the common-law right of first publication. Recall that the common-law
right of first publication comprises a two-step right: an author first has a
right to decide whether to publish; if the author does decide to publish,
the author next has a right to decide when to publish.402 In this manner,
the common-law right of first publication has protected a work up to the
time of publication.403 The first stage may be described as the right to
refrain from publishing, and it is this stage in which the author seeks to
maintain privacy.404 The second stage represents the time between the
decision to publish and the actual publication.405 As discussed above, the
author holds an interest in making the work commercial during this
second stage.406 This second stage in the right of first publication is
therefore preempted.407 Federal law governs from the point that an
author decides to publish, regardless of when the publication actually
occurs.
The argument that the Copyright Act does not preempt the entire
common-law right of first publication is seemingly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court decision in Harper & Row.408 There the Court suggested
that the Copyright Act preempts the common-law right of first
publication, even the portion of that right that had been applied to protect
privacy interests.409 Yet the actual holding of Harper & Row does not
require that that suggestion be valid. The issue in Harper & Row was
whether The Nation had infringed the copyright holder’s right of first
publication by publishing memoirs that were scheduled to be published

401. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (describing the fourth criterion as “the single most
important element of fair use”).
402. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication).
403. See supra Part II.A.2.
404. See supra Part II.A.2.
405. See supra Part II.A.2.
406. See supra Part II.A.2.
407. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (preemption applies whether published or not).
408. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Harper & Row).
409. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552–55 (1985)
(commenting that the Copyright Act “eliminated publication as a ‘dividing line between common
law and statutory protection,’ extending statutory protection to all works from the time of their
creation,” and discussing common-law copyright protection of privacy while discussing the scope of
the Act (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665)).
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at a later date.410 Key is the fact that the copyright holder had already
decided to publish the memoirs.411 As discussed in the paragraph above,
the Act does preempt the common-law right of first publication with
regard to works that are set to be published, although they in fact are not
published. This means that the Act preempted the common-law right
protecting the memoirs at issue in Harper & Row, for the author had
already decided to publish them.412 The Harper & Row Court’s language
suggesting that the Act preempts common-law protection of privacy413
was therefore not relevant to the issue under consideration. The facts
suggested that preemption applied with regard to an author’s commercial
interest in a yet-to-be-published work,414 so the troublesome language
was dicta.
Also relevant in analyzing Harper & Row’s language regarding
preemption is the fact that the 1992 Amendment appears to undermine
that language.415 To the extent the Harper & Row Court attempted to
hold that the Copyright Act adopted the privacy protection of commonlaw copyright, Congress appears to have abolished that holding through
the 1992 Amendment.416 The Amendment weakens Harper & Row’s
representation that the Act protects privacy, and consequently, the
Amendment also weakens Harper & Row’s representation that the Act
preempts common-law privacy protection. In conjunction with the 1992
Amendment, the law set forth in Harper & Row is consistent with the
argument that the Copyright Act does not preempt the common-law right
of first publication.
This argument against federal preemption of common-law copyright
raises interesting implications in the email context. As described in Part
II, common-law principles imply the following: (1) a private email may
not be forwarded by its recipient, regardless of how casual or trite the
correspondence;417 (2) protection for private expression is nearly
absolute;418 and (3) fair use is not in play.419 The common-law rule of
410. Id. at 541–42, 552–55.
411. See id. at 542–43 (discussing plans for publication).
412. Id.
413. See supra note 409 for a description of the Court’s comments that suggest the Copyright
Act preempts the common-law protection of privacy.
414. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554.
415. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the 1992 Amendment).
416. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
417. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
418. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the common-law right of first publication).
419. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549–51 (“[F]air use [under the common law] traditionally
was not recognized as a defense to charges of copying from an author’s as yet unpublished works.”);
see also supra Part II.A.2 (“The fact that an unauthorized copy may appear ‘reasonable and
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relinquishment further implies that if an email sender relinquishes his or
her common-law right of first publication by publishing the email,
federal law applies.420 This means that if the sender were to carbon copy
a third party, the sender would not be able to invoke the common law to
protect an otherwise private email.421 By carbon copying a third party,
the sender would publish the email, and thereby waive the common-law
right of first publication.422 The sender would forego common-law
protection of privacy. Any property interest in the expression would
exist only under the federal Copyright Act. As discussed above, federal
protection would be nonextant if the email correspondence were not
economically valuable: the sender would be stripped of privacy
protection by the fair-use defense.423 Thus, the common-law right of first
publication governs only to the extent that an email sender has not
carbon copied a third party on the email.
IV. A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF A DUAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
The above discussion has presented a theory for protecting privacy
interests in expression.424 That theory is to bifurcate an author’s right of
first publication between the common law and federal law according to
whether an author has affirmatively decided to publish the work.425
Works that are held private fall under common-law copyright; works that
will be published fall under federal copyright law.426 This is possible
because of a constitutional basis for concluding that the Copyright Act
does not preempt common-law protection of privacy in expression.427
Although this theory of a dual copyright system may be theoretically
plausible, the question of whether this theory can and should be put into
practice is another matter. A normative analysis of the theory is
customary’ does not affect the strength of the author’s common-law right [of first publication].”).
420. See supra Part II.A.2.c (discussing the common-law rule of relinquishment).
421. See supra Part II.A.2.c (“Common-law copyright rules . . . suggest that an email sender
relinquishes the right of first publication when the sender includes a carbon-copy or blind-carboncopy recipient in the email.”).
422. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
423. See supra Part III.A–B (concluding that “where an email expression has no commercial
value, the 1992 Amendment expressly places the expression outside the protection of federal
copyright law”).
424. See supra Part III.D.
425. See supra Part III.D.
426. See supra Part III.D.
427. See supra Part III.D (arguing that the wording of the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent
Clause makes it “unmistakably utilitarian in nature,” limiting Congress’s power to legislate such
property rights to the extent an author has an interest in realizing commercial gain).
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necessary to evaluate whether both a common-law and federal system of
copyright should govern property rights in expression.428
A. Determination of the Applicable Copyright System
The first issue that arises in evaluating the dual copyright system is
the pragmatic problem of how to determine whether an author has
decided to publish a work.429 If the author has decided to publish a yet
unpublished work, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to verify that
alleged decision. Believing that the common law provides a stronger
basis for prevailing against an infringer than does the Copyright Act, the
author might recant his or her past decision to publish. For a defendant,
establishing an author’s state of mind regarding the finality of a
publication decision raises a thorny issue of fact. Excessive resources
would be necessary to prove that the decision to publish has been made.
The practical barrier in reaching a determination of whether an author
has decided to publish arguably poses a pragmatic threat to the proffered
interpretation of the Copyright Act.
This practical barrier is resolvable by applying a simple rule: the
author should be able to choose which law applies. It is true that by
allowing a copyright holder to choose between the federal and commonlaw copyright systems, the copyright holder will always have the option
of choosing a system with near-absolute protection over a system that
allows for a liberal fair-use defense.430 Yet the disparity of remedies
under the two systems balances their disparity of expressive protection
available to the author. The remedies available under common-law
copyright would be an injunction against publication and compensatory
damages.431 Compensatory damages would lie only if the author could
establish emotional harm for invading expressive privacy.432 They would
not lie for any decrease in the expression’s market value. As a result, the
428. See infra Part IV.A–C.
429. See Leval, supra note 88, at 1120–21 (discussing factual intricacies that might arise in
attempting to distinguish between works created for publication and works held private).
430. An author could nearly always prevail on a copyright claim under common-law copyright
given its near-absolute protection of privacy interests. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the
common-law right of first publication). By contrast, an author would be subject to a liberal
application of the fair-use defense. See supra Part III.A.2–B (describing the fair-use doctrine, and
discussing applicable caselaw and legislative history).
431. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (Mass. 1912) (issuing injunction against publication
of letters); Personal Letters, supra note 328, at 708 n.31 (considering possible relief that commonlaw copyright affords author).
432. See Personal Letters, supra note 328, at 708 n.31 (“[I]t would seem that if damages have
been sustained a remedy at law exists.”).
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near-absolute protection available under the common law would only be
valuable to an author who is concerned with the privacy of the work.
Federal copyright law, on the other hand, provides remedies that are not
available under the common law: compensatory damages may be
awarded for the commercial value of the copyrighted expression, along
with statutory damages.433 The Copyright Act would therefore be
valuable to an author who is concerned with realizing the commercial
potential of the work. The remedies available under common-law or
federal copyright reflect the respective interests of either privacy or
commercial gain that an author may hold in the work.
If an author of an unpublished work chooses which law should
control the suit, the author will select the law corresponding to the
remedy that best serves the author’s interest. The author will accordingly
demonstrate the interest—privacy or commercial gain—that the author
values. Where an author is concerned with keeping a work private, the
author will bring suit under the common law. Where an author is
concerned with realizing the commercial value of the work, the author
will bring suit under federal law. There would be no thorny issue of fact.
A few examples illustrate the mechanics of a dual system of
copyright. An email that is a casual correspondence—for instance, a
simple invitation to lunch—may be the subject matter of an injunction
against the email recipient. The email sender may enjoin the recipient
from forwarding the simple expression in the email.434 If the recipient
has already forwarded the email, the sender may sue for damages.
Assuming the lunch-invitation expression is not of an embarrassing
nature, the sender would not be able to establish emotional harm caused
by the recipient’s forwarding of the email.435 If, however, the email were
of an embarrassing nature, compensatory damages would be available.
For instance, perhaps an employee sends an email to another employee
complaining of horrific work conditions. If the recipient forwards the
email to the sender’s employer, emotional harm would likely ensue. The
embarrassment of the exposure would invade the sender’s privacy, and
potentially result in the termination of the sender’s employment.

433. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)–(c) (2000). If infringement is willful, $150,000 may be awarded as
statutory damages; otherwise the maximum statutory damages amount is $30,000. Id.
434. It seems unlikely that any sender would expend resources necessary to enjoin a recipient
from forwarding such a seemingly innocuous email as an invitation to lunch. But perhaps the sender
was an employee who sent the email to a competitor of the employer; or perhaps the sender was a
spouse sending the email to a lover. Circumstances surrounding the expression may provide an
impetus to seek protection against email forwarding.
435. Only nominal damages would lie.
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Compensatory damages would lie for the emotional harm caused by the
copyright violation.
Examples of copyright protection for email under the federal system
are less apparent. Email is rarely sent with an intent to publish
commercially. But it is possible that circumstances could change so that
the sender would later decide to realize commercial gain by publishing
the email. A good example is Monica Lewinsky’s email regarding her
relationship with former President Clinton.436 At the time she sent it, the
email was most assuredly held private.437 But as events unfolded,438 she
could have sought to capitalize on the expression in the email. Her
publication decision could have arisen subsequent to sending the email.
This decision would have implied that the market value of the email
outweighed the value of the emotional harm that Ms. Lewinsky would
have incurred from its public exposure.439 When Newsweek magazine
published that email, Ms. Lewinsky could have brought suit under the
Copyright Act for violating her federal right of first publication.440 It is
arguable that Ms. Lewinsky would prevail on liability.441 Assuming she
did, damages would be available to compensate Ms. Lewinsky for the
market value of the email publication. There would be no damages for
any emotional harm that Newsweek’s publication caused her.
Thus, the seeming pragmatic difficulty of determining whether an
author has decided to publish may not present any difficulty at all. If an
author of an unpublished work has an option to decide whether to bring
436. See Crews, supra note 290, at 32 n.162 (postulating that Ms. Lewinsky’s email messages
could merit copyright protection).
437. See id. (citing He Could Have Called Me, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1998, at 26–27 (printing
excerpts from Ms. Lewinsky’s emails)).
438. Mark Ribbing, Events Leading to Clinton’s Grand Jury Appearance, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 16, 1998, at A4.
439. Assuming that the publication decision arose after the Ken Starr report, the emotional harm
resulting from publication of the specific email expressions would have been negligible because the
public already knew the details of her affair. See In Graphic Detail, Report Says Clinton Lied About
Affair, THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1998, at A15 (describing the Starr report as giving
“dense, at times unsettling, detail about a long-running series of sexual encounters between Clinton
and Lewinsky”); Referral to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code, § 595(c) Submitted by The Office of the Independent Counsel, September 9, 1998,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/icreport/srprintable.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2007) (Kenneth Starr’s final report on President Clinton to the U.S. House of
Representatives narrating the nature and circumstances of Clinton’s relationship with Monica
Lewinsky).
440. See Crews, supra note 290, at 32 n.162 (discussing possible copyright infringement by
Newsweek magazine).
441. The argument that Ms. Lewinsky would prevail is based on the fact that courts are reluctant
to find fair use based solely on a freedom-of-the-press argument. See, e.g., Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–46, 560 (1985) (rejecting appellate court’s
reasoning that freedom of the press justified finding of fair use).
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suit under the common law or under federal law, the author will select
the system that best protects the interest which the author values in the
work—privacy or commercial gain. The mutually-exclusive nature of
those interests precludes overlap.442 Available remedies under the two
different systems will result in the author self-selecting the actual interest
that the author values most.
B. The Merits of a Distinct Copyright System for Privacy
The reason for having both federal and common-law systems of
copyright is to provide a balance between the two competing interests of
societal utility and individual privacy.443 Yet the fact that a balance is
possible does not mean that it is desirable.444 A more fundamental issue
than whether the law does allow for the coexistence of both privacy and
utilitarian interests in expression is whether the law should allow for that
coexistence.445 There are obvious drawbacks to a distinct copyright
system, the purpose of which is to ensure privacy. To begin with,
effectuating common-law copyright will likely breed more litigation than
common-law copyright has in the past entertained. In the past, situations
for protecting privacy interests in unpublished works arose relatively
infrequently, usually over private letters that biographers or divorced
spouses sought to publish.446 Copying and distributing a private letter
was not common.447 Today the situation is markedly different.448 Email
forwarding has become routine.449 If a sender lacks discretion in drafting
442. See supra Part III.C (discussing the competing interests under the Copyright Act).
443. See supra Part III.C–D (offering resolution to the competing-interest dilemma).
444. See, e.g., Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info. What’s in
It for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (commenting on internet privacy and observing that users
“already have zero privacy” and so they should simply “[g]et over it”).
445. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 214 (1999) (arguing against legalizing
privacy rights on the basis that “publicness reduces the need for public control, while excessive
privacy often necessitates state-imposed limits on private choices” (internal endnote omitted));
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395–97 (1978) (arguing against the
concept of privacy offered by Warren and Brandeis—an interest in being let alone—on the grounds
that privacy serves merely to protect from, or capitalize on, imperfect market information).
446. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1987)
(contemplating circumstance of biographer seeking to avoid letter publication); King v. King, 168 P.
730, 731–33 (Wyo. 1917) (contemplating circumstance of former spouse publishing letter).
447. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“[G]oing from paper to bits lowers the cost of copying
and forwarding. It takes a pretty important letter to be worth the bother of Xeroxing, stamping, and
mailing, but even an infinitesimally small benefit is worth the minimal cost of clicking on the
forward button and typing in a few addresses.”).
448. See id. (recounting an illustration of today’s situation).
449. See id. (“People who wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email—and they’ll
forward it to more people. . . . Quasi-private emails leak out all the time now, not because we want
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an email, the sender’s words will likely be seen by many more than the
original recipient.450 Allowing a cause of action for email forwarding is
a recipe for liability based on happenstance. A litigious society will
exploit the opportunity to hold liable unsuspecting email recipients who
happen to forward expression.
It also seems foolish to create a cause of action where the emotional
harm to the email sender is caused, in large part, by the sender’s own
indiscretion. If a sender desires to keep a sentiment private, the sender
should have omitted it while drafting the email. Just as a cheating
husband one-hundred years ago should have thought twice before putting
incriminating evidence in a letter to his lover,451 so also should today’s
email senders think through indiscrete expressions before knowingly
creating an electronic record that can so easily be distributed to the
world.452 The very fact that the sender chooses to use email suggests that
the sender assumes a risk that the expression might be forwarded to
others.453 A legal remedy caused by a complainant’s own indiscrete
behavior seems unnecessary, if not wasteful.454
These two criticisms admittedly have strength. But they do not
overturn the argument for applying common-law copyright to email
expression. The benefit of protecting private expression outweighs its
cost of creating a cause of action that will give rise to seemingly needless
litigation that results in part from a plaintiff’s own seemingly
irresponsible actions. Protecting private expression from unauthorized
distribution facilitates creativity, frankness, and efficiency.455 Absent
protection, an author must guard against an unknown recipient eventually
obtaining a copy of the expression: such guarding imposes a cost on
what is private to become public, but because it has become so hard to tell private from public in the
context of email.”).
450. Id.
451. See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174, 175–76 (Vt. 1899) (providing account of a party seeking to
use such letters in criminal adultery proceedings).
452. See Mandel, supra note 6 (advising that email senders should restrict their expression to
that which the senders would be comfortable viewing on “the front page of [their] newspaper”).
453. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (“The median email is less private and more public in its
content than the median letter, not because our words care whether they travel by ink or by bits, but
because we have evolved a set of expectations about email that are less private and more public than
our expectations about traditional letters.”).
454. Cf. Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine of
assumption of risk properly bars a plaintiff’s claim only when it can be established that, because of
the nature of the activity involved and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owed the
plaintiff no duty of care.” (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707–08 (Cal. 1992))).
455. See Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (“[L]etters never intended to
be published, and written on familiar subjects, are usually more interesting and valuable than those
elaborately written and originally intended for the press.”); Mandel, supra note 6 (advising restraint
in email expression).
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expressive clarity and substance.456 Privacy protection ensures effective
communication of thought.457
Even assuming that the policy argument supporting privacy were no
stronger than the policy argument for decreasing excessive, wasteful
litigation, the alleged costs of securing privacy are doubtful. Excessive,
needless litigation would not likely result. As discussed above, the
primary remedies available under common-law copyright would be
either an injunction preventing the recipient from forwarding the email or
compensation for emotional harm.458 These remedies suggest that the
likelihood is fairly low that email senders would flood courts with
frivolous email-forwarding disputes: attorneys’ fees for enjoining a
recipient from forwarding an innocuous lunch-invitation email would
practically bar suit, and proving emotional harm over such an email
would be more than difficult, if not impossible. Yet even if courts were
flooded, the flooding would be both warranted and temporary. Privacy
of expression—no matter how trite the expression—merits protection.459
And as courts recognize this protection, public behavior regarding email
will change. The now-common practice of forwarding emails would
adjust so that email recipients would only forward them with permission.
This adjustment would thereby strengthen an email sender’s ability to
engage in frank and creative expression. Litigation would not be
excessive or wasteful.
V. CONCLUSION
Alive and well is the centuries-old argument for protecting privacy
of expression.460 Today that argument is especially important given the
456. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (commenting that email forwarding dulls the content and
context of email expression).
457. This protection is not absolute. As discussed in Part II.B.2, supra, the property rights of an
email sender are subject to the property rights that an email recipient holds in the physical email file,
and those rights of the recipient allow the recipient to show the sender’s expression to third parties.
Similarly, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, the sender’s rights are qualified under extraordinary
circumstances which would permit a third party to publish the sender’s expression.
458. See supra Part IV.A (comparing remedies available under common-law and federal
copyright systems).
459. See Woolsey, 11 How. Pr. at 63 (opining that property rights exist in private letters
“however familiar and trivial” the expression may be).
460. See, e.g., Teresa De Turris, Copyright Protection of Privacy Interests in Unpublished
Works, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277, 307 (1994) (“Protection of privacy interests in unpublished
works is reasonably within the domain of federal copyright law.”); Stephen B. Thau, Copyright,
Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 179, 202 (1995) (arguing that courts “protect an
author’s privacy by giving him the ability to control the reproduction and dissemination of works
that can be viewed as extensions of his personality”); Benjamin Ely Marks, Note, Copyright
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common practice of email recipients exploiting email senders’ privacy.461
The argument stems from the common-law right of first publication.462
That right allows an email sender to decide whether to publish the
expression in an email to someone other than the intended recipient.463
Only the sender may decide whether to copy and distribute the email
expression.464 If the sender does so, often by carbon copying a third
party, the sender relinquishes the right of first publication.465 If the
sender does not, the email recipient may not forward the email.466 This
protection of a sender’s private expression admits few exceptions.467
In contrast to the common-law right of first publication that an email
sender holds in email expression, email recipients hold property rights to
the physical email file.468 These property rights derive from the common
law’s recognition that a letter recipient holds property rights in the
physical components of the letter.469 By holding property rights to the
physical email file, the recipient may transfer the file to a third party,
which involves either transferring the storage device on which the file
exists or transferring access rights to view the file through an emailwebsite service.470 The email recipient may also print and display the
email at any location.471 Finally, it is noteworthy that unintended
recipients who receive email do not hold property rights to the email
against the sender.472
Federal law should not be construed to strip an email sender of this
common-law privacy protection.473 Although the Copyright Act purports
to provide authors a right of first publication, that right provides limited

Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1379 (1997) (proposing “an explicit, privacy-based exception to the fair use
doctrine”). See generally Robert C. Hauhart, Copyrighting Personal Letters, Diaries, and
Memorabilia: A Review and a Suggestion, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 244, 244–45 (1984) (arguing for
stronger protection of private expression).
461. See Grimmelmann, supra note 5 (observing that email forwarding has become
commonplace).
462. See supra Part II.A.2.
463. See supra Part II.A.2.
464. See supra Part II.A.2 (stating that authors can decide whether and when to publish their
work).
465. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
466. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
467. See supra Part II.A.2.
468. See supra Part II.B.
469. See supra Part II.B.
470. See supra Part II.B.1.
471. See supra Part II.B.2.
472. See supra Part II.B.3.
473. See supra Part III.
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to no privacy protection in view of the liberal fair-use defense.474 The
Supreme Court initially attempted to extend federal copyright law to
protect privacy interests in unpublished works, but Congress amended
the Act to cripple the Court’s attempt.475 The Act protects authors’
commercial interest to further its utilitarian purpose.476 It does not
protect privacy.477 The absence of federal privacy protection, however,
is not fatal to an author’s privacy interest.478 The Copyright and Patent
Clause in the Constitution requires the Act to have a utilitarian purpose,
which is mutually exclusive of a purpose that protects individual
privacy.479 Therefore, the federal right of first publication cannot be
interpreted as preempting the common-law copyright’s protection of
privacy.480 The common-law right of first publication that protects an
author’s decision whether to publish is a right that survives the Copyright
Act.481 Preemption does not apply.482
The normative argument in support of having both federal and
common-law copyright systems is simple.483 Two copyright systems are
necessary because the purpose of federal copyright law—utilitarian
public benefit—forecloses the opportunity to realize any privacy
protection.484 Privacy is a worthy end because it fosters creativity,
frankness, and efficiency in communication.485 Furthermore, enforcing
two systems to further their two distinct ends is pragmatically possible:
email senders will self-select which system serves the interest they most
value, commercial gain or privacy, based on the available remedies each
system offers; and any seemingly excessive litigation over email will in
the end be productive, ensuring senders’ privacy.486 For email to be as
thoughtful, clear, and creative as possible, privacy of expression must be
recognized. Copyright should protect email privacy.
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